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A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
BY DAYNA B. ROYAL*
ABSTRACT
In America's battle of the bulge, the bulge is winning.
Contributing to this obesity epidemic is Americans' increasingly
widespread practice of eating at restaurants where deceptively fattening
food is served to patrons who grossly underestimate the calories in their
meals.
To combat this problem and promote public health, Congress
enacted a federal menu-labeling law, which requires that restaurants
post calorie information next to menu offerings. The constitutionality of
this law has yet to be tested in court. But New York City's law, enacted
prior, has survived First Amendment scrutiny.
Like New York's menu-labeling law, the federal law should
withstand a First Amendment challenge. Though the federal law affects
commercial speech, it is a reasonable means for accomplishing a
legitimate government interest-the reduction of consumer deception
and the promotion of public health. The skinny on the federal menu-
labeling law is that it is an appropriate means to inform patrons' menu
choices at restaurants and help shrink America's waistline.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Obesity is among the most widespread and burdensome public
health issues facing the nation,' reaching "epidemic proportions." 2
1. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Surgeon General's Call to
Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity 2001, 1 (2001),
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf
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"[T]here are nearly twice as many overweight children and almost three
times as many overweight adolescents as there were in 1980," making
Americans "the fattest people in the Western world."4
According to a recent Surgeon General report, "[w]e already are
seeing tragic results from these trends."' Approximately 300,000 deaths a
year result from obesity,6 which has become a top public-health priority.
"Left unabated, overweight and obesity may soon cause as much
preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking."8 "Even moderate
weight loss among the overweight (a magnitude of 5 to 10 percent
weight reduction) can confer important health benefits."9
Yet "[c]alorie-dense foods are more accessible, more convenient,
and more frequently consumed than ever before."' 0 Restaurants serve
misleadingly fattening fare with far more calories than similar items
prepared at home." Consumers are ill-equipped to make health-
conscious choices even if they want to.
Studies show that restaurant patrons generally underestimate the
caloric content of their food.1 It is thus no surprise that frequent
consumption of restaurant meals is associated with an increased intake of
calories, increased weight gain, and increased risk of obesity.13
2. Id. at XIII.
3. Id.
4. MICHAEL FUMENTO, THE FAT OF THE LAND 32 (1997).
5. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1, at XIII.
6. Id.
7. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159, 160
(2009); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1, at XI. For a
discussion on how obesity kills and other adverse effects obesity brings, see
FUMENTO, supra note 4, at 10- 15.
8. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1, at XIII.
9. FUMENTO, supra note 4, at vii-viii. "To determine obesity, the government
uses the Body Mass Index (BMI), a formula comparing weight to height." Id. at 27.
In exceptional cases (like body builders), BMI may not be accurate, but for the
population in general, it is. Id.
10. Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 161.
11. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
12. See Jodi Schuette Green, Note, Cheeseburger in Paradise? An Analysis of
how New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health May
Reform Our Fast Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 733, 734 (2010).
13. Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 161.
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Debate has swirled over menu-labeling laws for years.14
Advocates argue that menu labeling will encourage consumers to order
and consume fewer calories, which will decrease obesity. 5 They also
contend that menu labeling "may encourage restaurants to reduce the
calories in standard menu items, reduce portion sizes, or offer new
healthy alternatives."' 6 And they argue that even if menu labeling alone
will not alter behavior, it is an important component of a "broader social
movement" to curb obesity and improve public health.
Opponents have lobbed many arguments against government-
mandated menu labeling. Civil libertarians maintain that "compelled
menu labeling to improve individual eating habits amounts to an
unwarranted and paternalistic government intrusion into private decision-
making and interferes with the free market."' 9 Others argue that
mandatory menu labeling places undue financial burden on restaurants
because they will need to spend money complying with the law and
because they will lose revenue normally generated from less healthy
20offerings.
14. See, e.g., Paul Frumkin, Revised NYC Menu-Labeling Law Reignites
Fierce Debate, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS (Feb. 3, 2008), http://www.nm.com/
article/revised-nyc-menu-labeling-law-reignites-fierce-debate (discussing various
menu-labeling laws and the controversy surrounding them); Paul Frumkin, Industry,
Watchdogs Prepare to Battle Over Dueling Menu-Labeling Mandates, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS (Dec. 7, 2008), http://www.nm.com/article/industry-watchdogs-
prepare-battle-over-dueling-menu-labeling-mandates (describing menu-labeling as
"controversial" and discussing debate surrounding it); Meg Marco, Judge Tosses
NYC Menu Labeling Regulation, THE CONSUMERIST (Sept. 11, 2007, 6:09 PM),
http://consumerist.com/2007/09/judge-tosses-nyc-menu-labeling-regulation.html
(discussing controversy surrounding New York's menu-labeling effort and menu
labeling in general).
15. See Michelle Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling
Law and Lessonsfrom Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRuG L.J. 901, 915 (2010).
16. Id at 917.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 917-20.
19. Id at 919. Richard Posner has suggested menu-labeling laws may be
considered "anticompetitive because requiring all restaurants to disclose nutrition
information eliminates the competitive edge of those restaurants, such as Subway,
that use voluntary provision of nutrition information as a marketing point for
attracting health-conscious consumers." Id. at 920.
20. See id at 918. But see id. at 914-15 (noting that some data has suggested
that the restaurant industry will not lose revenue from menu labeling, though there
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Until recently, federal law did not require that restaurants post
calorie information for their menu offerings.21 This changed on March
23, 2010,22 when Congress enacted wide-sweeping and controversial
23
healthcare legislation. Found within this lengthy law is the federal
government's first successful attempt at requiring that restaurants post
24
calorie coints on their menus.
may be revenue shifting "from chains offering primarily high-calorie items to
restaurants with more low-calorie options").
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i) (2006) (exempting restaurants from
labeling requirements), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §4205, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ("Healthcare Act").
22. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 4205,124 Stat. 119.
23. See id The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
recently held a provision of this Act, not relevant here, unconstitutional. See Va. ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, Nos. 11-
1057, 11-1058, 2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the
"Minimum Essential Coverage Provision exceeds the Commerce Clause powers
vested in Congress under Article I" and severing the offending provision). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida also held a provision
of this Act unconstitutional, but it concluded it could not be severed and thus the
entire Act could not survive. See, Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't Health and Human
Servs., 708 F.Supp. 2d 1256, 1298-99, 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, sub nom Fla. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't Health and Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (1Ith Cir. 2011).
24. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at
573-76 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)). Prior federal attempts
to implement similar mandatory disclosure requirements failed. See Green, supra
note 12, at 740-45 (tracing the federal government's failed attempts to impose
mandatory calorie-disclosure laws for restaurants).
In 1990, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") was amended by
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act ("NLEA"). See Wellife Products v.
Shalala, 52 F.3d 357, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The NLEA, codified at 21
U.S.C. § 343 et seq., reformed the FDCA in the following ways:
(1) [I]t required nutrition labeling for nearly all food products
under the authority of the FDA, with exemptions for small
businesses, restaurants, and some other retail establishments;
(2) it changed the requirements for ingredient labels on food
packages; (3) it imposed and regulated health claims on
packages; (4) it standardized all nutrient content claims; and
(5) it standardized serving sizes.
Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 2009).
After the NLEA, the FDCA expressly excluded restaurants from complying
with labeling requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i). The Healthcare Act
A similar mandatory calorie-disclosure law New York City
implemented has met with harsh opposition and litigation.25 A restaurant
association representing over 7,000 restaurants challenged the law and
argued, among other things, that it violated restaurant owners' First
Amendment rights.26 The Second Circuit rejected this claim, holding that
though the regulation impacted protected commercial speech, it survived
27scrutiny.
While New York's calorie-posting law was tested in court and
28
upheld, the question remains whether the federal law will receive
similar treatment. This article maintains that it should.
Part II analyzes New York's law and the Second Circuit's
analysis in New York State Restaurant Ass'n v. New York City Board. of
Health29 to provide a model for analyzing the federal law. Part III
evaluates this model as the appropriate test to determine whether the
federal law should survive First Amendment scrutiny, under the same
standard the Second Circuit applied from Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel.30 Finally, Part IV applies this test and concludes
that the federal law survives such scrutiny.
II. NEW YORK'S ORDINANCE PROVIDES A MODEL
In January 2008, New York City enacted an ordinance very
similar to the recently enacted federal menu-labeling law.' By doing so,
changed this. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at
573. One member of Congress described a similar but unsuccessful predecessor bill
to the Healthcare Act as closing a "loophole" created by NLEA's restaurant
exemption. See Banker, supra note 15, at 904.
25. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117
(2d Cir. 2009).
26. See id. at 117, 131.
27. See id. at 131-36.
28. See id.
29. 556 F.3d 114.
30. 471 U.S. 626, 651-53 (1985).
31. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., tit. 24, § 81.50 (2008). Before enacting this
ordinance, the city had enacted a slightly different ordinance that it repealed and
modified after a district court found that federal law preempted the first version. See
N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 120-21 (2d Cir. 2009). Prior to the federal menu-
labeling law, the Second Circuit found the current version of New York's law not
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New York became the first city to require calorie postings on restaurant
32menus.
This ordinance was soon tested in court.33 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York and, on appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entertained a First Amendment
challenge to this law, and it survived.34 Given the similarity of the two
laws, New York's law may provide a model for analyzing the federal
law.
A. New York City's Ordinance: Section 81.50
New York City Ordinance 81.50 requires that certain food
service establishments in the city (those included in groups of 15 or more
that operate nationally and either do business under the same name,
operate under common ownership, or are franchises) must display calorie
content on their menus and menu boards.3 5 The ordinance affects
approximately ten percent of all restaurants in the city.36
preempted. See id. at 117 (holding ordinance survives both a preemption and First
Amendment challenge).
32. Allison Auldridge, New Health Care Bill Requires Restaurants to Display
Calorie Counts, URBAN FOOD POLICY (Mar. 29, 2010), http://
www.urbanfoodpolicy.com/2010 03_01_archive.html. New York's ordinance was
"followed by similar citywide regulations in Connecticut, California and Washington
[S]tate." Id. For more information on state and local laws covering nutrition labeling
in restaurants, see NUTRITION LABELING IN CHAIN RESTAURANTS: STATE AND LOCAL
LAWS/BILLS/REGULATIONS: 2009-2010, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/ml bill summaries 09.pdf. Time will tell
whether these laws will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
33. See N Y. State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d 114 (examining the constitutionality of
this ordinance).
34. See id. at 117, 122.
35. tit. 24, § 81.50 (a), (c). Some may argue that this law is underinclusive
because it fails to cover many restaurants serving fattening food because, for
example, they have only one location. But a law need not tackle all issues in an
attempt to ameliorate some. If a legislature decides to improve public health by
requiring that chain restaurants post calories, it can do this without taking the
broader step of requiring that all restaurants post calories. See infra notes 97-99,
299-303 and accompanying text.
36. See N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 117. Some may argue that a law
affecting only ten percent of restaurants is underinclusive. But this is not a problem.
See supra note 35, infra notes 97-99, 299-303 and accompanying text.
The New York State Restaurant Association ("Association"),
representing over 7,000 restaurants, challenged this ordinance claiming
that it violated restaurants' First Amendment rights by compelling
commercial speech.3 7 Both the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit, affirming the district court, disagreed.
The appeals court first identified the speech as commercial
because it "proposes a commercial transaction." 39 According to the court,
because Section 81.50 "'requires disclosure of calorie information in
connection with a proposed commercial transaction-the sale of a
restaurant meal,"' it applies to commercial speech.40
Though commercial speech receives First Amendment
protection, the court acknowledged, it is less than the protection afforded
noncommercial speech, and the level of protection for commercial
speech depends on the type of commercial speech at issue.41 Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit explained that a crucial
difference exists between purely factual disclosure requirements and
42
restrictions on commercial speech. Per the court, the former receive
more lenient rational-basis review while the latter receive more rigorous
scrutiny.43 The court treated the ordinance as a factual-disclosure
requirement and held that it survived the relaxed level of scrutiny.
B. The Analogous Federal Law
The federal menu-labeling law is similar to New York's and
should receive similar treatment.45 The federal law requires that
restaurants and other retail food establishments with 20 or more locations
37. SeeN. Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 117-18, 131.
38. Id. at 117, 136.
39. See id. at 131 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 637 (1985)).
40. See id. (quoting N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, No. 08-
CLV-1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008)).
41. Id. at 131-32 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637).
42. Id at 132.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 131-34.
45. Compare NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., tit. 24, § 81.50 (2008) with Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11 1-148 § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119,
573-76 (2010) (to be codified and amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)).
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disclose the number of calories in food items offered for sale.4 6
Restaurants must prominently display calorie information on their menus
and menu boards.47
The federal law contains an additional provision. It requires that
menus and menu boards display a succinct "statement concerning [the]
suggested daily caloric intake," as specified by regulation "to enable the
public to understand, in the context of a total daily diet, the significance
of the caloric information that is provided."48
Despite this additional provision, the Second Circuit's treatment
of New York's law provides a useful guide. 49 As the Second Circuit
recognized, Zauderer should provide the framework for analyzing the
legitimacy of a menu-labeling law. Accordingly, the federal law should
survive such scrutiny.
46. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at 573-74.
Like New York City's law, the federal law only applies to restaurants with a certain
number of locations, and some may contend that the law is underinclusive. As with
New York's law, however, this should not pose a problem. See supra note 35-36,
infra notes 97-99, 299-303 and accompanying text.
47. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at 573-74.
The FDA's proposed rule states that "[c]overed establishments are required to post
calories and other information on menus and menu boards" and defines "menus" and
"menu boards" as "the primary writing of the restaurant ... from which a consumer
makes an order selection." Food labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu
Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments; Proposed Rule, 76
Fed. Reg. 66, 19,192, 19, 201 (proposed April 6, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 1 Iand 101).
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at 573-74.
This provision creates additional issues. See infra note 217.
49. Like the provision requiring posting of calories, the provision requiring
posting the recommended daily caloric intake is reasonably related to the
government's legitimate objective of dispelling consumer deception by providing
consumers with information to make healthy choices in an effort to curb obesity and
improve public health. See infra Part IV. Informing consumers about the appropriate
daily caloric intake is important because it provides context to calorie content of
specific menu items and thus enables consumers to understand the significance of
ordering a 1,000 calorie lunch. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Because
this additional provision provides information necessary to effectuate the law's
purpose, it furthers the law's objective and thus should also survive Zauderer. See
infra Part IV and note 217.
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III. ZAUDERER'S LENIENT STANDARD SHOULD APPLY
Though the federal law burdens commercial speech, it mandates
factual disclosures and does not restrict speech or compel opinions or
viewpoints. Zauderer's lenient review should thus apply.50
A. The Law Involves Commercial Speech
The First Amendment51  protects various types of speech,
52
including commercial speech. Defining commercial speech can be
tricky. Although speech that proposes a commercial transaction
quintessentially constitutes commercial speech,53 a combination of other
factors may also suggest speech is commercial.54 Citing the Supreme
Court, the Tenth Circuit has explained, "speech may properly be
characterized as commercial speech where, among other things, (1) it is
concededly an advertisement, (2) it refers to a specific product, or (3) it
is motivated by an economic interest in selling the product."
50. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985);
see also infra Part Ill.D.
51. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
52. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (noting that "[t]here is no longer any room to
doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment"). Commercial speech was not always entitled to
First Amendment protection. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914,
931 n.20 (3d Cir. 1990). Until 1975, it was considered "devoid of First Amendment
significance." Id.; see also Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1988)
(observing that the Supreme Court first began giving commercial speech First
Amendment protection in 1975).
53. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
473-74 (1989) (noting that the test for whether speech is commercial is whether it
proposes a commercial transaction).
54. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)
(citation omitted).
55. United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 847 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67); see also United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 479 (3d
Cir. 2005).
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Speech on menus and menu boards should satisfy this definition.
Menus and menu boards are vehicles through which restaurants propose
a commercial transaction-the purchase of food. Such speech offers food
products for specific prices. To assist consumers in deciding whether to
56. The fact that calorie-content speech on menus and menu boards arguably
touches on an important public issue, obesity, does not render the speech
noncommercial. Cf Bd. of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 475 (citing Supreme Court cases
that support the notion that speech can raise public issues while still remaining
commercial speech). The Court's "lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to
apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole
and the effect of the compelled statement thereon." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind,
487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted:
Riley involved a state-law requirement that in conducting
fundraising for charitable organizations (which [the Court has]
held to be fully protected speech) professional fundraisers
must insert in their presentations a statement setting forth the
percentage of charitable contributions collected during the
previous 12 months that were actually turned over to charities
(instead of retained as commissions).
Bd of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 474.
In response to the government's argument that the compelled statement
involved merely commercial speech, the Riley Court responded that even assuming,
arguendo, that were true, such speech was inextricably intertwined with fully
protected speech, charitable solicitation. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; see also Bd. of
Trustees, 492 U.S. at 474. The reason charitable solicitation is fully protected is
because it involves many speech interests, including the propagation of views and
ideas and the advocacy of causes. Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538
U.S. 600, 611-12 (2003). The Riley Court considered the compelled speech
"inextricably intertwined" with the protected charitable solicitation because the
government required that such speech accompany the charitable solicitation. See Bd.
of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 474. The Court explained that the speech should be
considered on the whole to determine its classification. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796;
see also Bd. of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 474. Here, unlike in Riley, the speech on the
whole concerns a commercial transaction, the sale of food. Menus and menu boards
contain information to that end. They advertise products available for sale and
inform the public about those products, including their cost. They do not contain
speech disseminating views and ideas nor advocating causes. In Riley, the overall
background speech was fully protected with the compelled statement arguably
commercial. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; see also Bd of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 474.
Here, the overall background speech is commercial with the mandatory disclosure
(calorie content in context of daily caloric total) also commercial. An argument that
calorie information should be fully protected is weak. Calorie counts in the context
of daily calorie totals are just like the other speech on menus: they provide
[Vol. 10150 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
accept such offers, and which offers to accept, menus and menu boards
contain relevant information about the products offered for sale,
including price and basic ingredients. Speech that proposes a commercial
transaction is the essence of commercial speech,17 and menus and menu
boards propose such transactions.
Menus and menu boards also satisfy other factors characteristic
of commercial speech. They are, in a sense, advertisements, which refer
to specific products, and they are motivated primarily by an economic
interest to sell products. An advertisement is defined as a paid
announcement of a good for sale. 59 Menus and menu boards should
satisfy this definition. Restaurants fund menus and menu boards to
announce goods and facilitate sales. Menus and menu boards refer to the
specific products offered, and their existence is motivated by restaurants'
interest in selling their goods. If restaurants did not advertise the products
with the necessary information (price, ingredients, size, etc.), then the
public would not know whether to accept the offer and purchase the
product. Because speech on menus and menu boards satisfies the
definition of commercial speech, the federal law regulating menus
involves commercial speech.60 The next question is what test applies to
determine the validity of such a law affecting commercial speech.
B. Two Tests for Commercial Speech: Central Hudson vs. Zauderer
Two relevant tests have emerged to determine whether
government regulation of commercial speech survives First Amendment
information to enable consumers to purchase products. Calorie information is not
itself commentary on the obesity epidemic that should be entitled to heightened First
Amendment protection. Given the overall context of menus and menu boards, which
is to sell food, speech contained therein, including calorie information, should be
classified as commercial speech.
57. See Bd. of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 473-74.
58. Cf Wenger, 427 F.3d at 847 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67) (describing
Bolger's three-part test for determining whether certain speech qualifies as
commercial speech).
59. See RANDOM HOUSE, WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 29 (2d ed.
1993).
60. See Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 189.
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scrutiny.6 The first test, set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
62
Corp. v. Public Services Commission , most appropriately applies when
a law restricts commercial speech.63 But where, as here, a law instead
compels disclosure of purely factual information, Zauderer's more
lenient test should apply.
1. Central Hudson
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., the Supreme Court
considered whether a regulation that banned promotional advertising
65 6violated the First Amendment. It concluded that it did.66
According to the test the Court fashioned, if commercial speech
is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government
61. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(providing one test); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servs. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (providing other).
62. 447 U.S. 557.
63. See Id. at 564; see also Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 170.
64. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 173-74.
This is far from unequivocal. See discussion infra notes 119-23 and accompanying
text; see also United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1143 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (suggesting that any time commercial speech is at issue, the Supreme
Court requires a substantial government interest and narrow tailoring-requirements
found in Central Hudson, not Zauderer). The D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the
Supreme Court always requires showing a substantial government interest and
narrow tailoring (essentially, requiring satisfying Central Hudson's requirements) is
incorrect. In reaching its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit cites a Supreme Court case that
does not stand for this proposition. See id (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480 (1989)). In Board of Trustees, the regulation restricted speech (compared to
requiring a disclosure), and the Court applied Central Hudson. See Bd. of Trustees,
492 U.S. at 471-72, 475. The Board of Trustees Court did not consider which test
applies to factual disclosures. See generally id at 471-86.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Wenger, and it
provided yet another framework for analyzing the interaction of Central Hudson and
Zauderer. See 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005); see also infra note 163
(discussing this framework).
Where a law instead compels disclosure of opinions and viewpoints, rather than
purely factual information, more rigorous scrutiny applies. See infra Part III.C.
65. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
66. Id. at 571-72.
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must assert a substantial interest justifying a restriction on the speech.
The restriction must directly advance the stated interest, and if the
interest could be served equally well by a less restrictive means, the
restriction may not survive. The party seeking to uphold the restriction
bears the burden to justify it.69
Settled principles aid in determining whether this test is satisfied.
First, regarding the state-interest prong, a court may not supplant the
70government's stated interests with other suppositions.
Second, the burden that the regulation directly advance the stated
interest "'is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech
must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
67. Id at 566.
68. Id Despite this language, Central Hudson does not impose a least-
restrictive-means requirement. See Bd of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 476-77.
69. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 n.7
(1994). "The Supreme Court has variously described the Central Hudson test as
having three or four prongs, depending on whether the preliminary inquiry into
whether the content to be regulated is protected is counted as a prong." Alexander v.
Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 88 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564-72 (describing test as four prong and applying the test); Fla. Bar v. Went for It,
Inc, 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995) (describing test as three prong). Here, the threshold
inquiry into whether the speech is misleading or unlawful and not protected at all is
considered preliminary to Central Hudson's three-prong test. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 165 (5th Cir. 2007) (treating inquiry of whether speech is
false or misleading as a threshold, which if answered negatively leads to applying
Central Hudson scrutiny); United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 848-49 (10th Cir.
2005) (setting forth Central Hudson as a three-prong test, which does not include the
preliminary question of whether the speech is misleading); cf Alexander, 598 F.3d at
89 (noting that government may freely regulate and even ban speech that is
misleading or concerns unlawful activity, but where speech falls into neither
category, it may only regulate commercial speech by satisfying Central Hudson's
remaining three prongs); id. at 90 (concluding first that the commercial speech is not
misleading or unlawful and therefore falls within the zone of protected commercial
speech before applying Central Hudson 's three prongs). But see id. at 88 n.5
(deciding to adopt four-part locution of the Central Hudson test throughout the case
since issue was the threshold question of whether speech was entitled to First
Amendment protection); Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002)
(describing Central Hudson as a "four-step process").
70. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 624 (1995) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
768 (1993)).
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will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."' 7 1 The record should
contain at least some evidence substantiating the allegations of harm.7
Third, in applying the final prong of Central Hudson, the Court
examines the fit between the state's interest and the means it chooses to
serve those interests.73 The means chosen need not be the least
restrictive74 but must reasonably fit with the government's ends. In
other words, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's objectives.7 6 "[T]he existence of 'numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech... is
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between
ends and means is reasonable."' 7 7 But the regulation need not provide
"the single best disposition."
2. Zauderer
The Supreme Court set forth the second test in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.79 There the Court considered "whether a
State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring
attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding
fee arrangements.",8 0
71. Id. at 626 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487
(1995)).
72. See id. This evidentiary requirement is not onerous. See id. at 628-29
(quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)) (explaining that the Court
has permitted speech restrictions "by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to
different locales altogether," or even "based solely on history, consensus, and
'simple common sense"').
73. Id. at 632.
74. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-78 (1989) (explaining that
despite language in Central Hudson suggesting that this prong imposes a least-
restrictive-means requirement, it requires only narrow tailoring).
75. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 632.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13
(1993)).
78. Id. This is not equivalent to rational basis review. Id.
79. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
80. Id at 629.
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Zauderer was an attorney who had advertised his services such
that if a client did not recover, she would owe "no legal fees."" The
State Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint charging "that the
ad's failure to inform clients that they would be liable for costs (as
opposed to legal fees) even if their claims were unsuccessful rendered
the advertisement 'deceptive' in violation of [Ohio Disciplinary Rule]."82
Both parties agreed that, other than the omission regarding the fee
arrangement, the ad "was not false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive.',83
Zauderer argued that the Court should essentially apply Central
Hudson to determine whether a disciplinary rule mandating a factual
disclosure survives scrutiny.84 The Court rejected Central Hudson in this
case, relying on broad language regarding the important differences
between factual-disclosure requirements and restrictions on speech.
Emphasizing that Zauderer "overlooks material differences
between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech," 86
the Court distinguished between prohibitions on speech and factual-
disclosure requirements and explained that the State had not prevented
attorneys from stating anything but had simply required that they provide
87more information than they otherwise would have.
According to the Court, factual-disclosure requirements are
entitled to lenient scrutiny, unlike restrictions on speech or laws
compelling opinions or viewpoints, which receive more-rigorous
review. In distinguishing between restrictions on speech and factual
disclosures, the Court explained that "[b]ecause the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides," a
81. Id. at 629-31.
82. Id. at 633.
83. Id. at 633-34.
84. See id. at 650 (noting appellant argued that the Court should apply the
same test to the factual-disclosure requirement as it applied to the restrictions on




88. See id. at 650-51.
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commercial speaker's interest in not providing particular factual
. 89information is minimal.
Factual-disclosure requirements thus tread much more narrowly
on First Amendment rights than do prohibitions.90 Therefore, as
Zauderer explained, commercial speakers' rights are "adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." 9'
Because Zauderer framed its test in terms of the government
interest at stake in that case, preventing consumer deception,92 some have
maintained Zauderer's scrutiny is limited to laws targeting consumer
deception, as opposed to laws targeting other government interests. 93 But
this interpretation ignores the Zauderer Court's repeated emphasis on the
importance of factual disclosures, in general, to provide the public with
information, and the minimal interest commercial speakers have to
withhold this information. 94
Zauderer rejected the argument that factual-disclosure
requirements are subject to a least-restrictive-means analysis.95
Accordingly, the Court will not strike a factual-disclosure requirement
simply because other less restrictive means exist to achieve the same
result. 96
The Court also rejected the contention that "a [factual-]
disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive' and




93. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095, 1144-45 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (suggesting that for disclosure requirements to be constitutional under
Zauderer they must be limited to purely factual and uncontroversial information
geared towards thwarting efforts to mislead consumers or capitalize on prior
deceptions); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966
(9th Cir. 2009) (categorizing Zauderer's standard as "the factual information and
deception prevention" standard (emphasis added)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495
F.3d 151, 166 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that unlike Zauderer, the case at issue
involves minimal potential for customer confusion and therefore, Central Hudson
applies).
94. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
95. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14.
96. Id.
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fails to address all aspects of the problem it intends to ameliorate. 9 7 "As a
general matter, governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal,
save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental that strict
scrutiny must be applied. The right of a commercial speaker not to
divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a
fundamental right."9 Thus, a factual-disclosure requirement, like the
federal menu-labeling law, should not be considered fatally under-
inclusive for targeting only part of the problem-in this case, only those
restaurants with 20 or more locations. 99
Zauderer also distinguished factual-disclosure requirements in
the commercial-speech context from compelled speech regarding
politics, religion, or other matters of opinion where the government
forces citizens "to confess by word or act their faith therein."' 00 Where
the latter is concerned, much more rigorous scrutiny applies."o
Zauderer thus presents a dichotomy. Factual-disclosure
requirements, which create less First Amendment concerns, receive more
lenient treatment than do prohibitions on speech or laws compelling
speakers to espouse certain messages with which they disagree.
C. Post-Zauderer Cases Maintain Distinction for Factual Disclosures
Cases following Zauderer have maintained the distinction
between factual-disclosure requirements, on one hand, and prohibitions
on speech and laws compelling espousal of opinions or viewpoints, on
the other. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed after Zauderer, "a zeal to
protect the public from 'too much information' [can] not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny."l02 But where Congress simply requires disclosure
to better enable the public to make informed choices, and it does not
97. Id
98. Id (citation omitted).
99. See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
100. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
101. See id.; see also Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 309
(1st Cir. 2005).
102. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 482 (1987) (citing Va. State Bd. of
Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
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prohibit giving additional information, Congress carries out the interests
embodied in the First Amendment. o3
As the Court again explained in a different case involving a
federal law that compelled disclosure, "[b]y compelling some disclosure
of information and permitting more, the Act's approach recognizes that
the best remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech contained within
materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech."'4 In
other words, where a law simply requires a commercial speaker to
provide some truthful information, the speaker may combat this law not
by attacking the compulsion of truthful information but by providing
more truthful information that supports the speaker's position.'os
Courts have also maintained the distinction set forth in Zauderer
for factual disclosures as opposed to compelled speech, which involves
subjective, non-factual information, like opinions and viewpoints.
103. See id. at 480-81.
104. Id. at 481.
105. See id. at 480-81.
106. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15
n.12 (1986) (distinguishing compelling purely factual disclosures from compelling
disclosure of the messages of third parties and noting that the government "has
substantial leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure requirements
for business corporations"); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556
F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (identifying relevant inquiry as whether calorie-count
requirement involves forced disclosure of purely factual information or whether it
involves compelled speech of a non-factual nature); Entm't Software Ass'n v.
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the relevant
question is whether the labeling and signage requirements involve purely factual
disclosures or compelled speech of a subjective, controversial, and opinion-oriented
nature); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848-51 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that requiring municipalities to engage in speech that educates and informs the
public is a permissible required disclosure and not compelled speech because it does
not compel the dissemination of an ideological message); see also Pomeranz, supra
note 7, at 181-82 (maintaining that courts treat compulsion of facts and beliefs
differently, and "[t]he rationale for treating statements of fact and those of belief
differently underlies basic principles of the First Amendment"). But see Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (acknowledging fact/viewpoint distinction in the commercial-speech context,
but noting that outside that context, the govemment may not compel expressions of
value, opinion, endorsement, or "statements offact the speaker would rather avoid")
(emphasis added); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.
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Where a labeling requirement mandates posting highly subjective
opinion-based information, it will be treated differently than where a
label requires providing objective facts, such as the "surgeon general's
warning of the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes."'
07
"Particularly in the commercial arena, the Constitution permits
the State to require speakers to express certain messages without their
consent, the most prominent examples being warning and nutritional
information labels."' 08 This approach makes sense. Compelling
disclosure of purely factual information does not force a commercial
speaker to espouse or otherwise take responsibility for views she does
not actually hold, and thus it raises less First Amendment concerns.109
Indeed, mandating factual disclosures "furthers, rather than hinders, the
First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the
efficiency of the 'marketplace of ideas.""' For this reason, requirements
mandating disclosure of purely factual information should receive less
scrutiny than requirements mandating disclosure of opinions and
viewpoints.
The Ninth Circuit echoed this understanding and applied
Zauderer beyond the attorney advertising context in Environmental
Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA.1 2 There the court held that a law
compelling municipalities to distribute educational materials about the
impacts of storm-water discharge on water bodies and the steps the
public should take to reduce pollutants in that water did not violate the
First Amendment." 3 Analogizing to Zauderer, the court explained that
requiring "appropriate educational and public information activities" is
1996) (noting that right not to speak "inheres in political and commercial speech
alike" and "extends to statements of fact as well as statements of opinion").
107. See Entm't Software Ass'n, 469 F.3d at 652. One commentator has
utilized an "Anti-Tobacco Paradigm" to address tackling obesity. See FUMENTO,
supra note 4, at 264-67.
108. Entm't Software Ass'n, 469 F.3d at 651 (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-16 (2d Cir. 2001)).
109. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
110. N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 132 (quoting Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 113-
14).
111. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
112. 344 F.3d 832, 848-51 (9th Cir. 2003).
113. See id. at 848-49.
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not the same as compelling dissemination of an ideological message.114
Though the latter may run afoul of the First Amendment, the former does
not.1' This is especially so where a law neither prohibits speakers from
adding their own views nor prohibits them from stating that federal law
required them to provide the information.116 Environmental Defense
Center thus confirms that a more lenient test applies to factual-disclosure
laws, as compared to laws compelling opmions or viewpoints or
restricting commercial speech. 117
Zauderer and its progeny reveal that courts treat laws differently
depending on whether they (1) require purely factual disclosures; (2)
compel the expression of ideas, opinions, or viewpoints; or (3) restrict
speech. Laws that simply require the disclosure of purely factual
information should receive Zauderer 's lenient scrutiny while laws that
compel expression of ideas, opinions, or viewpoints, or that restrict
speech face tougher scrutiny.
D. Zauderer Should Apply
The above framework suggests that Zauderer's lenient test for
factual-disclosure requirements should apply to the federal menu-
labeling law since it requires the disclosure of factual information,
namely calorie information on food offered for sale. But the analysis is
not that simple.
It is not clear. that Zauderer applies where the government
interest is something other than preventing consumer deception. 119 In the
114. See id. at 849-50.
115. See id. at 848-51.
116. See id. at 850.
117. Id. at 848-51; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. New York, 594 F.3d 94, 112
n.16 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that review is more lenient where law simply requires
disclosure of factual information as compared to restricting speech).
118. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
119. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. Some have limited Zauderer to laws
targeting consumer deception. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Zauderer carries no authority for
a mandate unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial
messages."); Charles R. Yates, Ill, Note, Trimming the Fat: A Study of Mandatory
Nutritional Disclosure Laws & Excessive Judicial Deference, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
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case of the federal menu-labeling law, it is questionable whether the
government interest involves preventing consumer deception. 120 Because
of the murkiness of the government's interest in enacting this law, some
might persuasively argue that Zauderer should not apply here.
According to this argument, where the government targets
something other than consumer deception, like obesity, 12 1 Central
Hudson, not Zauderer, applies even if the law requires a factual
disclosure.122 But as explained below, even though the case law is
inconclusive, Zauderer should apply to factual-disclosure requirements
even if the government interest is not strictly preventing consumer
deception.
And even if Zauderer applies only to factual-disclosure
requirements aimed at preventing consumer deception, it should still
apply to the federal menu-labeling law because shining a light on
deceptively fattening food is intertwined with curbing obesity.123 Thus,
Zauderer should apply to the menu-labeling law simply because it is a
factual-disclosure requirement. But even if Zauderer is limited solely to
factual-disclosure requirements targeting consumer deception, the menu-
labeling law should satisfy these requirements.
REV. 787, 812-13 (2010) (maintaining that Zauderer is limited to preventing
consumer deception and is therefore inapplicable where a law mandates disclosure
of calorie counts); cf also Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641-42
(6th Cir. 2010) (interpreting Zauderer and its progeny and suggesting that Zauderer
applies only to inherently and potentially misleading speech but also suggesting that
the critical distinction is really whether law imposes a disclosure requirement or
restricts speech); Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying
Central Hudson not Zauderer to disclosure requirements where speech is only
potentially, not inherently misleading); infra notes 132-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court cases suggesting Zauderer might be limited to laws
aimed at targeting consumer deception).
120. But see infra Part III.D.2.
121. But see infra Part III.D.2. (arguing that the government interest of
combating obesity is intertwined with preventing consumer deception).
122. But see Yates, III, supra note 119, at 812-13, 819-23 (contending that
though Central Hudson is a better test than Zauderer for a menu-labeling law,
neither Zauderer nor Central Hudson provides a perfect fit and fashioning a different
test).
123. Admittedly, the deception here is different from the deception in
Zauderer as discussed further below. See infra Part III.D.2.
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1. Zauderer Should Apply Because the Law is a Factual-Disclosure
Requirement
The government's interest should not dictate whether Zauderer
or Central Hudson applies. The better criterion is the nature of the law at
issue. Where a law mandates a factual disclosure, as is the case here,
Zauderer should apply.124
Some courts have followed this rule and broadly applied
Zauderer to laws requiring factual-disclosures. 12 5 For example, in New
124. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir.
2010). Where it restricts or prohibits speech, Central Hudson should apply. Cf.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 474 (holding it was error for lower court to apply Central
Hudson to test a law compelling the funding of commercial speech given that
Central Hudson involved a restriction on speech). Admittedly, doctrinal
uncertainties have emerged regarding whether disclosure requirements implicate
First Amendment interests to a lesser degree than restrictions on speech such that the
former should receive lesser scrutiny on that basis. See Conn. Bar Ass', 620 F.3d at
93 n.15 (quoting Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94
(2d Cir. 1998)).
125. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d
114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that "Zauderer's holding was broad enough to
encompass nonmisleading disclosure requirements") (emphasis added) (citing Nat'l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Pharm.
Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (Toruella, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the court found no cases limiting Zauderer's holding to
potentially deceptive advertising aimed at consumers); United States v. Bell, 414
F.3d 474, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Zauderer and noting that the government
may impose reasonable regulations to prevent consumer deception, and likewise
"mandatory disclosure of factual, commercial information does not offend the First
Amendment") (citations omitted); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Institute, Inc., 851 F.2d
365, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Zauderer and noting that "disclosure
requirements have been upheld in regulation of commercial speech even when the
government has not shown that "absent the required disclosure, [the speech would be
false or deceptive]"); cf Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848-51 (9th
Cir. 2003) (analogizing to Zauderer and finding that requiring municipalities to
engage in speech educating the public about the impacts of storm-water discharge
and about the hazards of improper waste disposal is a proper required disclosure
under the First Amendment and does not qualify as compelled speech). But see
Pharm. Care Mgmt, 429 F.3d at 316 (including state interest of preventing deception
to consumers as part of Zauderer's test and suggesting state interest did concern
preventing deception to consumers); Yates, III, supra note 119, at 812-13
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York State Restaurant Ass 'n, the Second Circuit explained that
"Zauderer's holding [is] broad enough to encompass nonmisleading
disclosure requirements."12 6 Thus, even where the government's interest
is merely preventing obesity, the Second Circuit found that Zauderer
.127
applies.
The Ninth Circuit similarly expanded Zauderer's reach when it
applied it to a regulation mandating that municipalities distribute
materials informing the public about the impacts of storm-water
discharge on national waterbodies and the steps the community can take
to reduce pollutants in storm-water runoff.128 The court did not require
129
consumer deception as a prerequisite to applying Zauderer.
Though some have applied Zauderer broadly beyond disclosure
requirements targeting consumer deception,130 at least two Supreme
(maintaining that Zauderer is limited to preventing consumer deception and is
inapplicable where a law mandates disclosure of calorie counts).
126. 556 F.3d at 133 (citing Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115).
127. See id at 133-34. But cf Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67,
74 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that consumer curiosity alone is not sufficient state
interest to compel disclosure of factual, commercial speech, but preventing
consumer deception would be under Zauderer). Despite the holding in Amestoy, the
Second Circuit explained in Sorrell that commercial-disclosure requirements are
subject to less scrutiny than restrictions on commercial speech, and it cited Zauderer
as the appropriate test for disclosure requirements. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 113-14.
In applying Zauderer, the court explained that the state's interest in protecting
human health and the environment was sufficient to satisfy Zauderer, and it
expressly recognized that the required disclosure did not target consumer deception
or confusion. See id. at 115. Rather, it aimed, by requiring labeling, to better inform
consumers about the products they purchase, and this is acceptable under Zauderer.
See id. The court distinguished Amestoy because in that case the state interest was
solely consumer curiosity, and consumer health was not at stake, but in Sorrell, it
was. Id. at 115 n.6. The Second Circuit reaffirmed this distinction in New York State
Restaurant Ass'n, explaining that combating obesity is sufficient reason to apply
Zauderer rather than Central Hudson. See N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 132-
33.
128. Cf. Envtl. Def Ctr., 344 F.3d at 849-51 (distinguishing cases like Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), where regulation requires that municipalities
distribute information educating public about the impacts of storm-water discharge
and the hazards of improper waste disposal).
129. See id. at 848-50.
130. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n., 556 F.3d at 133; Envtl. Def Ctr., 344 F.3d at
848-50; see also supra note 125.
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Court cases suggest that a narrower reading of Zauderer is appropriate.131
While Zauderer may apply only where consumer deception is at issue,
such a narrow interpretation is unnecessary.
In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,132 the Supreme Court held
that compelled subsidies for advertising violated the First Amendment.
In doing so, the Court maintained that its decision was not inconsistent
with Zauderer.134 Distinguishing Zauderer, the Court explained that there
was no suggestion in United Foods "that the mandatory assessments
imposed to require one group of private persons to pay for speech by
others [we]re somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements
nonmisleading for consumers," as was the case in Zauderer.' In
distinguishing Zauderer in this fashion, the Court suggests Zauderer may
be limited strictly to preventing consumer deception.
As the Second Circuit recognized in New York Restaurant Ass 'n,
however, this language need not be taken so far.136 United Foods
involved a compelled subsidy, not a mandatory disclosure,' 3 7 and is thus
distinguishable from the federal menu-labeling law here.138 Though the
131. See infra notes 132-55 and accompanying text.
132. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
133. Id. at 415-16.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 416.
136. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133
(2d Cir. 2009).
137. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408-09.
138. Though restaurants may have to expend funds to comply with the menu-
labeling law (to print new menus, compile calorie information, etc.), the law is not a
compelled subsidy of speech. See infra Part III.E.2. The Court distinguishes between
compelled speech and compelled subsidy. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n,
544 U.S. 550, 557, 564-65 n.8 (2005). In a compelled-subsidy case, the government
compels someone to subsidize someone else's private speech. See id. at 557, 565 n.8.
In a compelled-speech case, the government compels someone personally to espouse
a message. See id Because the menu-labeling law does not compel restaurants to
fund the private speech of another, the compelled-subsidy cases are inapposite. Cf
id. (holding that because a beef checkoff funded the Government's own speech, it
was not susceptible to a First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge). One may
argue that the menu-labeling law compels restaurants to fund government speech by
forcing them to expend money to provide calorie information, which in a sense is the
government's message. Cf id. at 559-67 ("Citizens may challenge compelled
support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund
government speech."). But the compelled funding of government speech does not
United Foods Court did not emphasize this point when it distinguished
Zauderer,13 9 this renders the law here different from the law in United
Foods and thus renders United Foods not expressly controlling.140
In the above language from United Foods, the Court emphasized
that Zauderer involved a different situation, but it did not hold that
Zauderer is limited only to that situation.141 Rather, the Court rebuffed
the suggestion that Zauderer was inconsistent because Zauderer involved
preventing consumer deception, and no one had suggested that United
Foods did.142 United Foods did not, however, foreclose extending
Zauderer to cover government interests beyond preventing deceptionl43
(as the Second Circuit did in New York Restaurant Ass'n).'
Yet another Supreme Court case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz
P.A. v. United States,145 suggests, while not squarely holding, that
Zauderer may be limited to laws aimed at preventing consumer
deception. But it too does not necessitate this conclusion.
create a First Amendment problem. See id. at 562. Furthermore, as this paper
maintains, the menu-labeling law does not compel espousal of a message. See infra
Part II.E. 1. It simply requires a factual disclosure.
139. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416.
140. Commentator Jennifer Pomeranz maintains that United Foods together
with a case that predated it, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457
(1997), actually supports the position that the government can require disclosure of
commercial speech for reasons other than avoidance of deception. See Pomeranz,
supra note 7, at 180-81. This is because, according to Pomeranz, United Foods
expressly upheld Glickman, which did not depend on avoidance of deception for its
factual-speech mandate. See id at 180-81. Yet the Glickman Court rejected Central
Hudson's rigorous review and subjected the subsidy to less rigorous review before
upholding it. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 467-70, 472, 474 (explaining that it was
error for lower court to apply Central Hudson's rigorous scrutiny to test
constitutionality of monetary assessments for generic, factually accurate
advertising). Pomeranz's analysis of Glickman in the wake of United Foods supports
the argument that compelled factual disclosures need not face tough scrutiny where
such disclosures serve a government interest other than preventing deception. But
see infra note 225.
141. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416.
142. See id
143. See id.; see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d
114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009).
144. See NY State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 133.
145. U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
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In Milavetz, the Supreme Court considered whether mandatory
disclosure requirements in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 violated the First Amendment.14 6 The
Court upheld the disclosure requirements, finding no First Amendment
violation.147 In deciding whether Zauderer or Central Hudson provided
the proper test, the Court explained that Central Hudson applies to non-
misleading commercial speech, and it agreed with the government's
position that the disclosures at issue targeted misleading speech. 148 "For
that reason, and because the challenged provisions impose a disclosure
requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on speech, the
Government contends that the less exacting scrutiny described in
Zauderer governs [the Court's] review."l 4 9 The Court agreed.150
In other words, the Court clarified that where a regulation both
targets misleading commercial speech and imposes a disclosure
requirement, Zauderer applies. The Court underscored that the
146. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1329 (2010).
147. See id.
148. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1339.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. See id. Yet another Supreme Court case seems to have followed this
paradigm. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146-
47 (1994). In Ibanez, the Court analyzed the action as a speech restriction, and it
applied Central Hudson. See id at 142-43. When, however, the Court addressed the
alternative argument that a disclaimer was minimally required to render the speech
not misleading, the Court cited Zauderer. See id. at 146. This suggests that the Court
believes Zauderer provides the appropriate standard where there is a mandatory
disclosure aimed at preventing consumer deception. But see Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208
F.3d 952, 958 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Ibanez to support conclusion that partial
restrictions on speech when combined with a required disclaimer must be supported
by some "identifiable harm," and a lack of such harm fails to satisfy Central
Hudson). In Mason, though the Eleventh Circuit also cites Zauderer, it appears to
think Central Hudson is the proper test where a disclosure is at issue because the
court finds that the mandatory disclosure violates Central Hudson. See id. In Mason,
the Florida Bar cited three interests as supporting its regulations, two of which did
not involve consumer deception, and it did so in the context of a Central Hudson
analysis. See id. at 955-56. It thus seems that the Eleventh Circuit believes Central
Hudson applies even where a mandatory disclosure is involved and the government
interest is not consumer deception. See id. at 955-58. The Mason court never
directly considered, however, the specific question of whether Zauderer or Central
Hudson applies to mandatory disclosure laws aimed at government interests other
challenged provisions shared the features of the rule in Zauderer, which
meant Zauderer clearly controlled.152 It did not, however, decide whether
Zauderer applies where a law does not necessarily target deceptive
commercial speech but still imposes a disclosure requirement.15 3
Milavetz therefore does not dictate whether Zauderer would not also
apply in that situation.154 Accordingly, Milavetz should not clearly limit
Zauderer to laws targeting only consumer deception.15 5
than consumer deception, though it appears to assume Central Hudson applies. See
id. at 956-58.
152. See Milavetz, U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1340; see also Conn. Bar
Ass'n v. U.S., 620 F.3d 81, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2010) (following Milavetz and doing
similarly in similar situation). In Connecticut Bar Ass'n, the court, interpreting
Milavetz, suggests that the critical determining factor for when to apply Zauderer is
whether the law at issue suppresses speech or compels a factual disclosure. See
Conn. Bar Ass'n, 620 F.3d at 96 (explaining that Second Circuit precedent points to
the same conclusion as Milavetz and citing precedent emphasizing that Zauderer
applies to mandatory disclosures while Central Hudson applies to speech
restrictions); see also id at 98 n. 18 (emphasizing the distinction between mandatory
disclosures and suppression of speech).
153. See Milavetz, U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1339. But see id at , 130
S. Ct. at 1344 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] disclosure requirement passes
constitutional muster [under Zauderer] only to the extent that it is aimed at
advertisements that, by their nature," are "inherently likely to deceive or . . . [have]
in fact been deceptive."). Justice Thomas questions the very premise of Zauderer,
"that, in the commercial-speech context, 'the First Amendment interests implicated
by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech
is actually suppressed[.]"' Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1343 (quoting Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 n.14 (1985)). Indeed, Thomas "would be
willing to reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an appropriate case to determine
whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment protection against
government-mandated disclosures." See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1343. This is not the
first time a Justice has expressed discontent with the distinction between restrictions
on commercial speech and mandatory disclosures. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n, 620
F.3d at 93 n. 15 (noting Justice Brennan's opinion in Zauderer where he maintained
that Central Hudson should apply to regulation of commercial speech whether
outright suppression or mandatory disclosure).
154. But see infra note 155.
155. At least one court has declined to read Milavetz narrowly, though it
appears to have construed Milavetz as limiting Zauderer to misleading speech. See
Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640-42 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that Milavetz established that Zauderer applies where a disclosure requirement
targets speech that is "inherently" misleading and extending Zauderer to cover
disclosure requirements targeting speech that is only potentially misleading).
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After Milavetz explained why the rule in Zauderer was
analogous, it distinguished a different case, In re R.MJ,156 in which the
Court applied Central Hudson.' The Court's treatment of In re R.MJ.
might also suggest a narrow interpretation for Zauderer, but this too is
unnecessary. As Milavetz noted, because the rules at issue in In re R.MJ.
prohibited attorneys from advertising certain things, and the commercial
speech at issue was not inherently misleading, Central Hudson
applied. 158
The Milavetz Court's distinction of In re R.MJ is no more
dispositive here than the Court's analogizing to Zauderer. It provides
essentially the same information. Where a law both restricts speech and
does not target misleading speech, Central Hudson applies.159 This still
does not dictate which test applies if only one of these conditions is
satisfied, i.e., where a law does not restrict speech but instead compels a
factual disclosure (Zauderer), and where the law is not necessarily
directed at misleading speechio (Central Hudson).16 Thus, Milavetz
does not undermine the position that Zauderer, not Central Hudson,
There is language in Milavetz suggesting the Court may have intended to limit
Zauderer to disclosure requirements aimed at combating misleading speech. See
Milavetz, U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1339-40. For instance, the Court states that
the challenged provisions share the "essential" features of the rule at issue in
Zauderer, one of which being that the law targets consumer deception. See id. at
, 130 S. Ct. at 1340. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the Court uses this
term to mean the relevant features or the requisite features (i.e., both features must
exist for Zauderer to apply).
156. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
157. Milavetz, U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
158. See id.; see also In re R. M J, 455 U.S. at 203-07 (invalidating three
restrictions upon an attorney's First Amendment rights because the speech within his
advertisement was not inherently misleading).
159. See Milavetz, U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
160. This assumes that the menu-labeling law does not aim to prevent
consumer deception, a point discussed and disputed in Parts I1l.D.2. and IV.B.
161. See Milavetz, U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1339-40. Of course the Court
in In re R. M J. could not have even considered applying Zauderer as Zauderer was
not decided until three years later. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (decided in 1985), with In re R. M J., 455 U.S. 191
(decided in 1982).
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applies to test the validity of a menu-labeling law.162 This position
remains viable.163
Bolstering this position is language from yet another Supreme
Court case. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,'1  a case with
fractured opinions, three Justices supported the position that the decisive
factor for deciding which test to apply is whether a law restricts speech
or compels a factual disclosure. According to those Justices, "[w]hen a
162. See N. Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d
114, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2009).
163. See id. But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 164-68 (5th Cir.
2007) (applying Central Hudson where the potential for consumer confusion is
minimal, and the provisions at issue both restrict and compel commercial speech);
United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005); Int'l Dairy Foods
Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Central
Hudson where law compels, as opposed to restricts, commercial speech). In New
York State Restaurant Ass'n, the Second Circuit distinguished International Dairy
Foods Ass'n because that case .'was expressly limited to cases in which a state
disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than the gratification of
consumer curiosity."' N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 134 (quoting Nat'l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir.2001)). New York's menu-
labeling law, however, was enacted to prevent obesity, and this rendered
International Dairy Foods Ass'n, and its application of Central Hudson to a law
compelling (rather than restricting) speech, inapplicable. See id. at 132, 134.
In Wenger, the court had an interesting way of resolving the question of how
Zauderer and Central Hudson interact. It explained that in the context of disclosure
requirements, Zauderer eases the burden of satisfying Central Hudson because it
"presumes that the government's interest in preventing consumer deception is
substantial, and that where a regulation requires disclosure only of factual and
uncontroversial information and is not unduly burdensome, it is narrowly tailored."
Wenger, 427 F.3d at 849. In other words, according to this court, where a disclosure
requirement is involved, Zauderer does not provide an additional test but rather
supplies some of the elements of the Central Hudson test. This seems to be a stretch,
however, given that Zauderer instructs that where it applies, the government need
only show its disclosure requirements satisfy its reasonable relationship rule. See
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. Further, because Zauderer post-dates Central Hudson, if
the Supreme Court intended Zauderer simply to provide the elements for Central
Hudson, it could have stated this, yet it did not. See id. Indeed, Zauderer expressly
rejected the argument that Central Hudson's standard applied to test the validity of
the factual-disclosure requirement. See id. at 650-5 1.
164. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
165. See id. at 501 (Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (plurality
opinion).
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State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the
disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional
protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict
166
review." On the other hand, when a state prohibits the dissemination of
non-misleading commercial messages, "there is far less reason to depart
from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands."l67 Because the advertising ban in 44 Liquormart constituted a
"blanket prohibition against truthful, non-misleading speech about a
lawful product," and it "serve[d) an end unrelated to consumer
protection," the Justices reviewed it with "special care," and applied
Central Hudson.168
This approach is also supported by Zauderer.69 As the Court
noted there, extending First Amendment protection to commercial
speech "is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides."l 70 Providing more information to
consumers is why commercial speech receives First Amendment
protection in the first place. A commercial speaker's interest in not
providing information is minimal. Because this interest is minimal and
thus easily overcome, the government should not have to satisfy the more
stringent Central Hudson standard but instead should only have to satisfy
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 504 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servs.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
169. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133
n.22 (2d Cir. 2009) ('"Ti]he First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure
requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually
suppressed . . . ."') (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651 n.14 (1985)). New York State Restaurant Ass'n also reasoned that Zauderer
is broad enough to encompass factual-disclosure requirements irrespective of
whether the government interest is preventing consumer deception. See id. at 133
n.21.
170. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citing Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
171. Id.
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the more lenient Zauderer standardl72 where a factual disclosure is at
issue.
Thus, though not without question, Zauderer should apply to
factual disclosures even if the government interest is not preventing
consumer deception. A better inquiry to determine whether Central
Hudson or Zauderer applies is whether the regulation restricts
commercial speech or compels a factual disclosure.
2. The Government Interest is Intertwined with Preventing Deception
Assuming, however, Zauderer should only apply where the
government interest is preventing consumer deception, it should still
apply to the menu-labeling law at issue here. This is because preventing
consumer deception is intertwined with preventing obesity.
At the outset, it should be stated that any deception involved in
menu listings is different from the deception in Zauderer. In Zauderer,
the deception stemmed from an affirmative statement contained within
an attorney's advertisement.174 The advertisement provided some
information, namely that if clients did not recover, they would owe "no
legal fees,"l 75 yet it did not state that if they did not recover, they would
still be liable for costs (as compared to fees).176
The advertisement made no mention of the distinction between
"legal fees" and "costs," and to a layman not aware of the meaning of
these terms of art, the advertisement would suggest that employing
appellant would be a no-lose proposition in that his representation in a
losing cause would come entirely free of charge.177
This rendered the advertisement "deceptive" in violation of an
Ohio Disciplinary Rule. 7 1
Specific menus of course vary, but generally, menus provide
food for sale with corresponding prices. Menus often also provide
172. See id.
173. See also infra Part IV.B.
174. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631, 633-34.
175. Id. at 631.
176. Id. at 631, 633.
177. Id. at 652.
178. Id. at 633-34.
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descriptions of the items offered for sale, and these descriptions may
deceptively suggest menu items are healthier than they are.17 9 But even if
not, restaurant meals are often themselves deceptive.
As noted at the beginning of this paper, diners frequently
underestimate the calorie content of their restaurant meals,'so which can
lead to massive additional calories consumed. s8 Why do consumers so
grossly underestimate the calorie content of their meals? Perhaps they are
foolish or delusional. But restaurants contribute to and benefit from this
misperception.
One reason diners are misled is that restaurants often sell foods
that contain unbelievably large amounts of calories. Consumers may
reasonably assume that restaurant meals are somewhat comparable to the
same meals prepared at home, or at least, restaurants' versions are only
slightly more fattening. These should be reasonable and fair assumptions.
If a ham and cheese sandwich at home has 350 calories, then one at a
restaurant may have 400 calories or even a few more, the reasoning goes.
But this is incorrect. For example, a ham and Swiss cheese
sandwich on rye bread prepared at home may have approximately 350
calories.182 At the popular restaurant chain, Panera Bread, this same
179. One "study found that restaurants claiming to offer healthier food cause
consumers to underestimate calories in main dishes and then order highly caloric
side dishes, drinks, or desserts." Banker, supra note 15, at 916.
180. See Green, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Alexander Chernev, The Dieter's Paradox, 21 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL., 178 (April 2011), available at http://www.chemev.com/
research/articles/The DietersParadox_2011 .pdf (arguing that because some people
erroneously tend to believe that by adding a "healthy" option to their "unhealthy"
meal, it reduces overall calorie intake as opposed to increasing it).
182. 166 calories, 2.2 fat grams for two slices of rye bread, see Calories in
Bread, Rye, CALORIE COUNT, http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-bread-rye-
i18060 (providing calorie content for one slice of bread, doubled here for a
sandwich) (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); 60 calories, 1.5 fat grams for a serving of 2
ounces of deli-meat ham, see Calories in Honey Ham-Deli Counter, CALORIE
COUNT, http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-healthy-choice-honey-ham-deli-
i82143 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); 80 calories, 7 fat grams for a serving of deli
Swiss cheese, see Calories in Natural Slice Swiss, CALORIE COUNT,
http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-deli-deluxe-natural-slice-swiss-i99797 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011); 2 calories, 0 fat grams for lettuce, see Calories in Lettuce,
Cos or Romaine, CALORIE COUNT, http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-lettuce-
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sandwich weighs in at 590 calories.183 That is a sizeable difference,
which many reasonable consumers could not foresee.
Given this disparity that many restaurants create by selling
deceptively fattening food, 18 it makes sense that diners underestimate
cos-romaine-i 1l251 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); 7.5 calories, 0 fat grams in half a
medium tomato, see Calories in Tomatoes, CALORIE COUNT, http://caloriecount.
about.com/calories-tomatoes-i80399 (providing information for an entire tomato,
halved for a sandwich) (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); 10 calories, 0 fat grams for a
quarter of a medium red onion, see Calories in Onion Red, CALORIE COUNT,
http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-whole-foods-onion-red-i 118275, (providing
calories for entire onion, quartered for a sandwich) (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); 35
calories and 3 fat grams for a serving of Miracle Whip Mayonnaise, see Calories in
Dressing, CALORIE COUNT, http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-miracle-whip-
dressing-il26376 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); and 5 calories, 0 fat grams in a
teaspoon of mustard, see Calories in Spicy Brown Mustard, CALORIE COUNT,
http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-goldens-spicy-brown-mustard-i 139172 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011). If the sandwich instead contains regular mayonnaise, as
opposed to Miracle Whip, it will have an additional 55 calories and 7 grams of fat.
See Calories in Real Mayonnaise, CALORIE COUNT, http://caloriecount.about.com/
calories-hellmanns-real-mayonnaise-i97424 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
183. See Panera Bread Nutition Information, PANERA BREAD, http://www.
panerabread.com/pdf/nutr-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (includes nutritional
information for the Full Smoked Ham & Swiss on Stone-Milled Rye sandwich). This
sandwich includes 96% fat-free ham, Swiss cheese, lettuce, red onion, tomato, salt
and pepper, and rye bread. See Bakery-Cafi Menu, PANERA BREAD, http:lwww.
panerabread.com/pdf/menu.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
184. Contributing to the disparity may be that portions are often much larger
than a single serving at restaurants. See FUMENTO, supra note 4, at 44-48.
Restaurants serve outrageously large portions, which in aggregate anchors
consumers toward believing that such portion sizes are appropriate. Id. Restaurants
also misleadingly characterize portions as "small," suggesting that one may order a
larger size, when the "small size" is already much larger than a healthy amount. Id.
at 46, 48. "A 'large' soda fountain drink in Europe is often smaller than the 'small'
size sold here." Id. at 46. "A 'medium' theater popcom now contains sixteen cups."
Id. at 44. And restaurants use terms like "lite" or "low fat" when items are still
incredibly fattening. Id. at 71-77 (noting that the food industry rakes in
"megabucks" from encouraging overconsumption by labeling food "reduced fat" and
"guilt free" despite the fact that foods contain a lot of calories, like The Cheesecake
Factory's "Lite Cheesecake," which has nearly 600 calories); see also id. at 184
(noting that restaurants sell items that are outrageously caloric due to their portion
sizes as compared to regular sized portions of the same items). Author Michael
Fumento has maintained that portion sizes at restaurants have caused consumers to
become completely confused as to appropriate portion sizes, which even causes
the caloric cost of their restaurant meals. Whether restaurants actively
intend to deceive or they intend to earn the most profits and deception is
only a secondary effect, diners are often misled. 85
Without calorie information, diners might reasonably assume
that they are making health-conscious choices when they are not.187 " Few
people would guess that a small milkshake has more calories than a Big
Mac or that a tuna sandwich from a typical deli contains twice as many
calories as the roast beef with mustard."' And many diners would
probably believe that a salad with chicken is a healthier choice than a
steak, but the Cobb Salad with grilled chicken at the popular restaurant
chain Chili's contains 710 calories and 52 grams of fat, which is nearly
twice as many calories and six times as much fat as their Grill Classic
Sirloin Steak, which has 370 calories and 9 grams of fat.1
Many restaurants actively contribute to consumer misperception
by selling foods that contain many more calories and fat than they would
if prepared at home, and by presenting foods as healthier than they
over-consumption at home also. Id. at 47-48 ("Someone confronted with a mass of
giant hamburger sandwiches at every hamburger outlet may understandably
conclude that a normal-size hamburger contains a third or a half pound of beef, and
will start to make and consume such sandwiches at home [and] in restaurants.").
185. Even assuming restaurants do not intend to mislead consumers, Zauderer
may still apply because it does not require mens rea. See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985) (discussing the likely possibility
of consumer deception). Zauderer does not even require proof that the public will
actually be mislead. Id. When the possibility of deception is fairly "self-evident," the
Court assumes it is true. Id.
186. "[A]bout half of restaurant chains [already] provide calorie information
but put it in places where it is unlikely to be seen." Marion Nestle, Health Care
Reform in Action - Calorie Labeling Goes National, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2343,
2344 (2010), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1003814.
187. See, e.g., Banker, supra note 15, at 916 (offering some reasons why
diners might reasonably assume they are making healthy decisions at restaurants
when they are not). Restaurants cause this diner misperception. See supra note 181.
188. Menu Labeling, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
http://www.cspinet.org/menulabeling/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
189. See Nutritional Information, CHILI'S, http://www.chilis.com/EN/
LocationSpecificPDF/MenuPDF/001.005.0000/Chilis Nutrition Menu Generic.pdf
(last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
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actually are. 19 0 This may be because fattening food is often perceived as
tastier than healthier alternatives,"' and tastier food leads to increased
profits.192 But given the current zeitgeist favoring healthy eating,
restaurants suggest that items on their menus are healthier than they
actually are.
Deceptive advertising suggesting that foods are healthier than
they are is nothing new in the food industry. According to FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, "concerns that food labels may
mislead consumers about the nutritional value of their products ha[s]
caught the attention of the agency."' 94 As a result, "food manufacturers
have been called on the carpet," the most recent in June "when
Kellogg['s] was warned for making false claims on the front of one of its
bestselling cereals: Rice Krispies."l 95 Kellogg's advertised that the cereal
improved children's health, a claim not backed with scientific
evidence.196 This unsupported claim was similar to the company's claim
last year that Frosted Mini Wheats improves children's attentiveness. 9 7
190. See Resources: Menu Labeling, CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
ADVOCACY, http://www.publichealthadvocacy.org/resources menulabeling.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2011); See also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
191. See FUMENTO, supra note 4, at 88 (maintaining that Americans have
become accustomed to the taste of sugary and caloric foods and that items lacking
the requisite large amounts of sugar are not palatable to the average American); see
also Banker, supra note 15, at 919 (noting that consumers may perceive healthy food
as less tasty than less healthy food).
192. See Banker, supra note 15, at 918 (noting that an argument against menu-
labeling is that it will decrease restaurant revenue because consumers may stop
ordering unhealthy items when they realize just how unhealthy they are). Bigger
portions also lead to increased profits. See FUMENTO, supra note 4, at 44-45. "By
one estimate, nearly 25 percent of the $97 billion American consumers spent on fast
food in 1995 went for items promoted on the basis of a larger size or extra
ingredients." Id. at 44. Restaurants that provide increased portions have received
increased popularity and profits. See id. at 44-45.
193. See CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY, supra note
190; see also supra note 184.
194. Susan Brady, FDA Cracking Down on Deceptive Advertising, HEALTH
NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. For more dubious cereal marketing by Kellogg's competitor, General
Mills, see Bonnie Liebman, Name that Deception-Deceptive Advertising by the
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Like Kellogg's, fast food giant McDonald's deceived customers with
their food marketing.198 They described their french fries as vegetarian
(perceived as healthy) despite that they included beef fat (lard, perceived
as unhealthy) in their preparation.199 After a lawsuit, McDonald's
"agreed to donate $10 million to Hindu and vegetarian groups as part of
a settlement."200 By actively deceiving consumers, food peddlers cause
misperception about the healthfulness of their foods.
Of course, consumers are not completely without responsibility
for their misperception of the calorie content of their restaurant meals.
Many factors may contribute to it. One might be wishful thinking. A
diner might like to eat a giant bacon cheeseburger but not want to worry
about the damage to her waistline, so she fudges the numbers in her head
to make herself feel better about her purchase.20 1
Though consumers may shoulder some responsibility for
deception over their restaurant meals, Zauderer should still apply.
Food Industry, NUTRITION ACTION HEALTH LETTER (Dec. 1993),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0813/is-nl0 v20/ai 15498342/.
198. Seth Stem, Fast-Food Restaurants Face Legal Grilling: Lawyers Explore
Whether the Fast-Food Industry should be Liable for the Effects its Meals and
Marketing have on Public Health, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 8,
2002), http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0808/pl4s0 1 -usju.html.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Other psychological processes may also be at issue. One researcher
coined the term "dieter's paradox" to describe an issue the calorie conscious have
with accurately estimating the caloric content of their food. See Chernev, supra note
181, at 178. According to marketing professor Alexander Chernev, consumers tend
to underestimate the caloric content of their food, and this propensity is even
stronger among weight-conscious people. See id at 178-79. Chernev's research
revealed that consumers unknowingly believe that combining a healthy item with an
unhealthy item reduces the calories in the unhealthy item. See id. at 179-80.
Participants in Chernev's study erroneously estimated that a bowl of chili paired
with a green salad contained fewer calories than one not paired with this healthy
side. See id at 179. Chemev described this phenomenon as a "negative-calorie
illusion." See id at 178. Consumers think that they can eat more food because part of
what they are eating is healthy, as if the healthy item contains negative calories that
remove calories from the fattening item. See id. This fallacy leads to
overconsumption. See id at 180-81. Chernev's findings show that consumers are
easy targets for deception regarding the calorie content of their meals. See id.at 181-
83.
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Zauderer does not require that consumers bear no responsibility.2 After
all, consumers reading Zauderer's advertisements could have questioned
whether no "legal fees" owed to Zauderer meant no money due for the
case at all, such as to the court for filing the case, but the Court did not
203put the burden on consumers. Rather, it put the burden on the
commercial speaker to disclose more information and eliminate any
potential deception caused by advertising his services.204 The same
should occur here.
Because restaurant meals contain a misleading amount of
calories, diners do not realize that with their restaurant meals they are
consuming extra calories, which results in weight gain and an increased
risk of obesity.205 The federal menu-labeling law shines a brighter light
on the calorie content of restaurant meals. This information assists
consumers and prevents them from being misled into believing that their
meals are less fattening than they actually are. Because the federal menu-
labeling law reduces consumer deception,206 Zauderer should apply even
if Zauderer only applies to factual-disclosure requirements that target
207consumer deception.
Zauderer, not Central Hudson, is the appropriate framework to
test the validity of the federal menu-labeling law. Zauderer should apply
to this factual-disclosure requirement irrespective of whether the
202. See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985) (requiring an attorney to avoid deceptive or misleading messages in
advertisements, but not removing consumer responsibility in interpreting the
advertisement).
203. See id. at 652.
204. See id. at 652-53.
205. See supra notes 179-84, 189-200 and accompanying text.
206. In New York State Restaurant Ass', New York City alternatively argued
that its menu-labeling law was adopted to prevent misleading advertising practices
(as compared to informing the public to prevent obesity) and would thus be subject
to Zauderer for this reason. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556
F.3d 114, 133 n.21 (2d Cir. 2009). Because the court "conclude[d] that laws
mandating factual disclosures are subject to [Zauderer] even if they address non-
deceptive speech, [it did] not reach this argument." Id.
207. Nothing in the relevant provisions of the Healthcare Act forecloses the
argument that the menu-labeling provisions target consumer deception. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119,
573-76 (2010) (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)).
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government interest is solely preventing consumer deception. But even if
Zauderer is limited to laws targeting consumer deception, it properly
applies to this federal law.
E. The Compelled-Speech and Subsidy Paradigms Should not Control
Another framework is arguably relevant to determining whether
a menu-labeling law should survive constitutional scrutiny: the
compelled-speech and compelled-subsidy lines of cases. These doctrines
are not controlling here, however.
1. Compelled-Speech Doctrine is Inapposite
In Zauderer, the Court distinguished the compelled-speech line
of cases, from Wooley v. Maynard 208 back, in which the Court found that
compulsion to speak may violate the First Amendment.209 As the
Zauderer Court recognized in fashioning a different test for factual-
disclosure requirements, the state was not attempting to "'prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'210
Rather, the state was attempting "only to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising," and it did so by imposing a purely
factual-disclosure requirement, not a compelled political or ideological
message.211 The Court subjects such a factual-disclosure requirement to
212
Zauderer's lenient scrutiny.
208. 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that the State may not "constitutionally
require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it
be observed and read by the public").
209. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-51; cf Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d
832, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing cases like Wooley v. Maynard from
Zauderer and regulations requiring municipalities distribute information educating
the public about impacts of storm-water discharge and hazards of improper waste
disposal).
210. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 650-51.
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The federal menu-labeling law is analogous to Ohio's
requirement that Zauderer disclose that clients would be liable for costs
in addition to fees.213 It is a law mandating the disclosure of purely
factual information: the calorie content of menu items in the context of a
214
recommended daily calorie intake. The law requires that the Secretary
provide by regulation a succinct statement of the suggested daily caloric
intake.215 The law does not compel restaurants to express any opinions on
healthy food versus unhealthy food or to otherwise editorialize on
obesity. 2 16 It simply requires that restaurants provide facts-the number
of calories in menu items in the context of the total number of calories
healthy for daily consumption.217 It does not prevent restaurants from
213. See id. at 633; see also Envtl. Def Ctr., 344 F.3d at 849-50 (analogizing
to Zauderer and distinguishing cases like Wooley v. Maynard where regulations
require municipalities to distribute information educating the public about impacts of
storm-water discharge and the hazards of improper waste disposal).
214. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,




217. Admittedly, the requirement that restaurant's provide a statement
regarding the recommended daily caloric intake is less straightforward than the
requirement that they provide calorie content. The latter is clearly factual
information, but the former, which is the government's recommendation, seems less
like a "fact" and more like an opinion of how many calories one should consume in a
day. Because the menu-labeling law does not provide the phraseology of the
suggested daily caloric intake but instead grants the Secretary authority to create the
statement, it is difficult to assess the actual statement. But one can imagine that it
may be based on the Dietary Guidelines the Department of Health and Human
Services and the USDA publish every five years. See Dietary Guidelines for
Americans 2010, U.S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
http://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga20l0/DietaryGuidelines2010.pdf (last visited
Oct. 19, 2011). These guidelines are based on recommendations put forth by a
committee of scientific experts who create a report on which the public has an
opportunity for notice and comment. See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services & Department of Agriculture, Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2005,
http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document/pdflDGA2005.pdf;
Press Release, U.S.D.A., USDA and HHS Announce New Dietary Guidelines to Help
Americans Make Healthier Food Choices and Confront Obesity Epidemic,
http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/201 0/PolicyDoc/PressRel
ease.pdf It is thus likely that restaurants will need to provide the fact of what the
scientists, public, and government have discovered is the average, healthy, daily
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adding any other information or from editorializing viewpoints for or
against healthy eating.28 Because the menu-labeling law mandates a
factual disclosure of commercial speech rather than compelling the
espousal of a political or ideological message, it is more akin to Zauderer
than to the compelled-speech cases, which should not govern.
2. Compelled-Subsidy Doctrine is Inapposite
Related to the compelled-speech line of cases and similarly
219
distinguishable here is the compelled-subsidy doctrine. Compelled
speech requires an individual to personally express a message with which
caloric intake. This fact is necessary to provide context to the calories in menu items.
See supra note 49. This is similar to a requirement that a label provide the Surgeon
General's warning of the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes. See Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing the
subjective labeling of video games from the surgeon general's warning that
cigarettes contain carcinogens). And it is similar to the requirement that
municipalities distribute educational materials about the impacts of storm water on
waterbodies and what the public can do to reduce pollutants. See Envtl. Def. Ctr v.
EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848-50 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Ninth Circuit has explained,
requiring distributing "appropriate educational and public information activities" is
not the same as compelling espousal of an ideological message. See id at 849-50.
Further, the menu-labeling law does not prevent restaurants from adding editorials
with their own views on this recommended daily caloric intake. Id. For example, the
USDA recommends 2,000 calories a day, but McDonald's thinks 4,000 a day is
more appropriate. Cf Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, U.S.
, _,130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (noting that challenged provisions share
Zauderer's features, including that disclosures provide only accurate statements, and
they do not prevent conveying additional information); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650
(explaining that factual disclosures simply require a speaker to provide more
information but do not prevent a speaker from stating anything); see also supra notes
103-05 and accompanying text. Though less straightforward than the calorie counts,
this aspect of the law should not render the law compelled speech. See supra notes
106-11 and accompanying text.
218. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at
573-76.
219. At least one commentator thinks this doctrine is relevant here. See
Pomeranz, supra note 7, at 178-81. In discussing this framework, Jennifer Pomeranz
identifies two central cases governing compelled funding of speech in the
commercial context: U.S. Dept. ofAgric, v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001) and a
case predating it, Gliclanan v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
See id.
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she disagrees. In contrast, a compelled subsidy occurs when an
individual is compelled to subsidize someone else's private speech with
which she disagrees.220 The compelled-subsidy cases grew out of the
compelled-speech cases, the idea being that if the government may not
compel a person to express a message, then it should not compel a person
to fund the same message of another private party.22 1
"In all of the cases invalidating exactions to subsidize speech,
the speech was, or was presumed to be, that of an entity other than the
government itself."222 If, however, the subsidy is to fund government
speech (even if someone other than the government is the actual
223
speaker), the First Amendment is not implicated.
The compelled-subsidy cases are not controlling for menu-
labeling laws for two reasons. First, the compelled-subsidy cases grew
out of the compelled-speech cases, which the Supreme Court
distinguished in Zauderer, and the compelled-subsidy cases are
*224
distinguishable here on the same basis. Assuming that the menu-
labeling law requires restaurants to expend funds (to alter their menus,
compile calorie information, et cetera), this is not money expended
disseminating another's ideological message. Rather, it is money
expended to provide factual disclosures, and as Zauderer shows, this is a
225crucial distinction.
220. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557, 565 n.8 (2005).
221. See id at 557; see also United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410. In United
Foods, the Court explained that just as the First Amendment may prevent the
government from compelling individuals to espouse views with which they disagree,
so too may it prevent the government from compelling individuals to fund views
with which they disagree. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410. In the former, one is
compelled personally to express a message or viewpoint while in the latter she is
required to subsidize someone else's expression of it. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557. The
Court has thus invalidated laws requiring compulsory funding of private entities'
political speech or speech espousing certain views with which the funder disagrees.
See id at 557-58; see also United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410-11, 413. But see
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 413 (noting that the compelled assessment need not
necessarily fund political speech to implicate the First Amendment).
222. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.
223. See id. at 559-64.
224. See supra notes 208-211, 219-21 and accompanying text.
225. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51
(1985). Analyzing United Foods and Glickman, Pomeranz makes a similar point. See
Pomeranz supra note 7, at 179-80. She argues that the compelled funding of
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political or ideological speech should be distinguished from the compelled funding
of generic advertising that does not promote a particular political or ideological
message. See id. Pomeranz suggests that United Foods and Glickman present a
dichotomy. See id Where a regulatory scheme compels funding of generic, factually
accurate advertising, this does not offend the First Amendment, but where the
government mandates subsidizing a message with which the commercial actor
disagrees, this creates a First Amendment issue. See id According to Pomeranz,
"there is an important distinction between these two cases that often goes
unrecognized. In United Foods, the Court found that the compelled message was
contrary to the producer's interests and beliefs, but in Glickman, the scheme at issue
was for 'factually accurate advertising."' See id. Pomeranz thus maintains that
"United Foods stands for the proposition that the government cannot require a
speaker to subsidize a controversial viewpoint." See id Pomeranz's interpretation
supports the point made here, that compelled subsidies of viewpoint messages differ
from compelled subsidies for factual disclosures. It seems, however, that Pomeranz's
interpretation of these two cases does not sufficiently account for an important point.
The distinction between these cases also hinges importantly on the extensiveness of
the regulatory scheme at issue. In United Foods, a federal statute regulated
mushroom handlers, but it did not mandate cooperation amongst handlers as the
comprehensive regulatory scheme in Glickman did. See United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
at 408. The statute in United Foods mandated that mushroom handlers pay
assessments to fund advertising to promote mushroom sales. Id. A mushroom
handler challenged the assessments as violative of the First Amendment because
they forced the handler to fund the message that mushrooms were worth consuming
irrespective of the brand, yet the handler wanted to convey the message that its
mushrooms were superior. See id. at 408-09, 411. The Court explained that
Glickman did not control. Id at 409. It phrased the issue as "whether the government
may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies
exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being
advanced." Id. at 411. Citing the cases prohibiting the government from compelling
individuals to express certain ideas, the Court explained, "First Amendment
concerns apply here because of the requirement that producers subsidize speech with
which they disagree." Id at 410-11. This supports Pomeranz's point that an
important issue is whether the subsidy compels funding viewpoint speech versus
funding factually accurate, generic advertising. But United Foods' treatment of
Glickman shows that this is not the entire story; equally important is the nature of the
regulatory scheme in which the compelled subsidy arises. As the Court explained,
the program upheld in Glickman differed "in a most fundamental respect." Id. at 411.
"In Glickman the mandated assessments for speech were ancillary to a more
comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. [In United Foods] . . . the
advertising itself, far from being ancillary, [wa]s the principal object of the
regulatory scheme." Id at 411-12. The Court thus distinguished Glickman, where
the compelled subsidy did not violate the First Amendment because it involved a
detailed regulatory scheme that already favored cooperation over autonomy. Id at
Second, any funds restaurants expend to comply with the law do
not fund another's private message. Even assuming that the law requires
restaurants to expend funds disseminating a message as compared to
factual disclosures-a point disputed above-it is the government's
"message" and not the message of another private party. Compelled
funding of the government's message does not pose a First Amendment
226problem.
Neither the compelled-subsidy nor compelled-speech paradigms
should control analysis of the menu-labeling law. Zauderer provides the
best lens available for analyzing the validity of this law.227
IV. THE MENU-LABELING LAW SHOULD SURVIVE ZAUDERER
The federal menu-labeling law should withstand Zauderer's
scrutiny. To survive, the menu-labeling law need be only reasonably
228related to the government's legitimate interest.
The government's interest in providing calorie information to
eliminate deception so that consumers may make more healthful
restaurant selections to curb obesity and improve public health is
unquestionably a legitimate interest.229 And the means the government
has chosen to accomplish that goal-mandating the posting of calorie
information on menus and menu boards-is reasonably related to the
230
government's purpose. The law should easily satisfy Zauderer's
lenient requirements.
412. Because the Court emphasized the nature of the regulatory scheme in
distinguishing United Foods from Glickman, it is difficult to conclude for sure that
these cases show that the nature of the subsidy itself dictates whether the subsidy
violates the First Amendment.
226. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
227. At least one commentator maintains that neither Zauderer nor Central
Hudson provides a perfect fit for menu-labeling laws, and a hybrid between Central
Hudson and strict scrutiny is preferable. See Yates, supra note 119, at 812, 819-23.
228. See infra Part IV.A.
229. See infra Part IV.B.
230. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Zauderer's Lenient Standard
Zauderer never expressly identified the level of review the Court
applied.23 1 Instead, it stated that "an advertiser's rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." 232
This standard has been variously described as a reasonable-
relationship rule,233 a rational relationship test,234 and rational-basis
235
review. Labeling is less important than ascertaining the test's general
231. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53
n.14 (1985).
232. Id. at 651.
233. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir.
2001); Ryan M. Murphy, Supreme Court Issues Final Word on Constitutional
Challenges to Regulation of Attorney Speech Under BAPCPA, 19 NORTON J. OF
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 283, 288 (2010) (describing Zauderer's rule as the "reasonable
relationship standard"); Yates, supra note 118, at 808; Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What
the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of Persuasive
Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 875 (2010); Sara
Murray, Comment, The Whole Truth or Nothing but the Truth? Should Attorneys
Who Advertise Be Required to Disclose Prior Disciplinary Actions Taken Against
Them?, 21 ST. MARY'S L. J. 953, 980 (1990) (citing Zauderer as establishing
"reasonable relationship review for disclosure requirements" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Jeannine Lane, Comment, New York's Treatment of Attorney
Advertising: Greater First Amendment Freedoms, But at What Cost?, 51 ALB. L.
REV. 51, 90 (1986).
234. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950,
966-67 (9th Cir. 2009).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010)
(stating that commercial-disclosure requirements trigger a rational-basis test and
citing Zauderer for this); Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting that Zauderer stated a rational-basis test); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v.
Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 642-43 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Zauderer and treating
rational basis as part of it); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556
F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In light of Zauderer, this Circuit thus held that rules
'mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial information' are subject to
the rational basis test" (quoting Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 114-15)); Pharm. Care Mgmt.
Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, J., concurring)
("[Zauderer's test] is a test akin to the general rational basis test governing all
government regulations under the Due Process Clause."); Lane, supra note 233, at
90.
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elements so they can be applied to other situations, particularly where the
government interest is other than preventing consumer deception.
One element of this test is the government's interest. Though the
Court never specified the level of interest Zauderer requires, it provided
a clue when it rejected appellant's argument that Central Hudson should
apply, which would have required a substantial government interest and
satisfaction of intermediate scrutiny.236 According to the Court,
appellant, in arguing for this more stringent test, "overlooks material
differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on
237 238speech." The former need not satisfy as intense scrutiny as the latter.
This suggests that whatever level the government interest in Zauderer is
specifically categorized as, it is less than substantial, and Zauderer 's test
is less than intermediate scrutiny.
The Court provided another clue when it instructed that a
commercial speaker's interest in not providing factual information is
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) should be
distinguished here. In that case, the Court broadly stated that it has rejected rational-
basis review to judge restrictions on commercial speech. City of Cincinnati, 507
U.S. at 417 n.13. This does not apply here because the law is a factual disclosure not
a restriction on speech. Indeed, the case that City of Cincinnati cites for this premise
rejects rational-basis review as a component of Central Hudson's test, not
Zauderer's. See id. at 417 nn.12-13; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
475-81 (1989).
236. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-53 n.14; see also Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz P.A. v. United States, _ U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010)
(describing Central Hudson's scrutiny as intermediate). The Second Circuit appears
to have followed the Supreme Court in Zauderer. See N. K State Rest. Ass 'n, 556
F.3d at 131-32. In New York Restaurant Ass'n, the Second Circuit failed to classify
the government's asserted interest of combating obesity as legitimate, important,
substantial, or compelling. See id. at 134-36. Nor did it engage in the preliminary
task of identifying what level of government interest Zauderer requires. See id.
Instead, it skipped this and addressed whether New York's law is reasonably related
to its goal of combating obesity. See id. The court seems to have implicitly found
combating obesity is a government interest equivalent to preventing consumer
deception, but it never overtly states this. See id. at 134. However, the court does
state that it is applying rational basis review. Id. From this one can assume that the
requisite government interest at stake is a "legitimate" one. See 16 C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 204 (2011).
237. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
238. See id. at 650-51.
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minimal.239 If the speaker's interest is minimal, one can fairly assume
that the government's interest need only be slightly more than minimal to
outweigh the speaker's interest.
240
Rational basis review requires a legitimate interest, the least
government interest of the three traditional levels of constitutional
scrutiny.241 Borrowing the level of government interest from this test
makes sense in light of the Court's description of the interest in
Zauderer.242
239. Id. at 651.
240. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 204; see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 480
(noting that the rational basis test is satisfied if the law furthers a legitimate
government goal).
241. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-76 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny and
showing that rational basis is the least stringent test); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 623, 632 (1995) (noting that rational basis review is less rigorous than
Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753, 790-91 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing these forms of scrutiny
and noting that intermediate is between strict scrutiny on one end and rational basis
on the other); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that intermediate
scrutiny is between the extreme leniency of rational basis and extreme stringency of
strict scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing rational basis as the "least rigorous" standard of
review). The three traditional levels of constitutional scrutiny are rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634
(2008) (noting that these are the traditionally expressed levels of constitutional
scrutiny).
242. Even assuming that Zauderer's test is not akin to rational basis because
rational-basis review is seldom applied where First Amendment rights are at stake,
see MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAw 32 (7th ed. 2005), the
government's interest in preventing consumer deception to improve public health
should satisfy the requisite interest provided by intermediate scrutiny because it is an
important and substantial interest. Cf, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,
296 (2000) (finding government interest in protecting public health and safety is an
important interest); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (noting that the
physical health of the citizenry is of "transcendent importance"); Fla. Bar, 515 U.S.
at 625 (finding interest substantial because it is connected to protecting public health
and safety); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (explaining that government
interest in preventing consumer deception is "substantial"). Perhaps the interest
Zauderer requires lies somewhere between legitimacy and importance. Either way,
the interest at stake here should satisfy this standard because it is an important
interest.
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The second element is the relationship between that interest and
the means chosen to accomplish it. Zauderer provides that the means
must be "reasonably related" to the government's interest.243
"Reasonably related" seems similar to "rationally related," which
describes the means in rational-basis review.244 "Reasonable" is defined
by Webster's Dictionary as "capable of rational behavior" and "rational"
is "agreeable to reason; reasonable; sensible." 245
Even if not identical to the very lenient rational-basis standard,
Zauderer shows that "reasonably related" is not a particularly stringent
246requirement. There the Court hardly scrutinized the State's reasons for
its factual-disclosure requirement, finding that the rules easily passed the
test because the State's "assumption" that substantial numbers of
consumers would be misled was supported by "commonplace"
knowledge. The Court did not require any evidence but instead found
the State's position "reasonable enough" to support its disclosure
248 . 249requirement. This is hardly searching or rigorous scrutiny.
250
Admittedly, Zauderer involved attorney advertising, and one
may contend that this is why the Court implemented a standard
deferential to government regulation. As the Court highlighted, a
layperson not familiar with legal terms of art could read Zauderer's
advertisement and not appreciate the difference between legal fees and
243. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
244. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 204.
245. See RANDOM HousE, WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1603, 1608
(2d ed. 2001); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 738 (2007) (describing a court's use of "reasonableness" as the court
applying rational-basis review); cf also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REv. 683, 688 (2007) (explaining that state courts use a
reasonable-regulation standard in the Second Amendment context that is not
identical to the rational-basis review used elsewhere in the law, but it is equally
deferential).
246. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. But cf Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (finding law
survived rigorous strict scrutiny because "[a] long history, a substantial consensus,
and simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling places is
necessary to protect that fundamental right" (emphasis added)).
250. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
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other financial obligations, such as costs.251 Restaurant menus, of course,
do not generally contain such terms of art puzzling to a layperson.
But the Court did not limit Zauderer to cases involving attorney
advertising.252 Rather, the Court rejected the State's argument that it
should treat Zauderer's advertising differently because it was legal
advertising, explaining that it is no more difficult to distinguish truthful
and accurate claims from misleading and deceptive claims in legal
253
advertising than in other advertising. It rejected a qualitative
distinction between attorney advertising and other advertising, stating
that "assessment of the validity of legal advice and information contained
in attorneys' advertising is not necessarily a matter of great complexity;
nor is assessing the accuracy or capacity to deceive of other forms of
advertising the simple process the State makes it out to be. Zauderer
251
thus is not limited to attorney advertising.
Though Zauderer is not limited to attorney advertising, the type
of advertising and other situational factors may be relevant in
determining the amount of evidence needed to determine whether the
government's means is reasonably related to accomplishing its
256
objective. Where, as in Zauderer, the possibility of harm is "self-
evident," the Court does not appear to require the government to support
it with any evidence, relying instead on "assumption[s]."25 7 If, however,
251. Id
252. See id. at 644-45, 650-51.
253. See id. at 644-46.
254. Id. at 645-46. Though the Court has treated some forms of attorney
communication as special and particularly likely to involve overreaching, like in
person solicitation, see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-67
(1978), not all attorney communication need receive special treatment. See
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644-46.
255. Courts have applied Zauderer beyond the legal context. See, e.g., Int'l
Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 640-42 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying
Zauderer to labeling dairy products); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of
Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131-34 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Zauderer to calorie-
disclosure law); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying Zauderer to regulation requiring municipalities to distribute information
educating public about impacts of storm-water discharge and hazards of improper
waste disposal).
256. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53.
257. See id.
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the possibility of harm absent government intervention is not self-
evident, then perhaps the state 'must offer some evidence to satisfy
Zauderer's standard.
The government may thus need to show that absent calorie
information, consumer deception at restaurants is self-evident and may
be assumed. Or, the government may need to present some evidence
supporting this contention. For instance, it may cite to studies showing
that without menu labeling, restaurant meals mislead consumers. Though
the government may need to provide some evidentiary support to satisfy
Zauderer where the risk of harm is not self-evident, this should not
prevent Zauderer's lenient review from applying in the first place.
Zauderer's standard thus should apply here and require showing
that the menu-labeling law is reasonably related to the government's
legitimate interest of preventing deception to enable consumers to make
healthier restaurant-meal selections to curb obesity and improve public
health. Even if reasonably related is slightly more stringent than
rationally related, the menu-labeling law should survive this standard. It
is not unreasonable to believe that with more information consumers will
be empowered to make healthier decisions, and this will improve public
health to some degree. The government may, however, need to support
this with more than bare assumptions to satisfy Zauderer.
B. The Government's Legitimate Interest
Though the menu-labeling law does not explicitly state the
government's interest,258 two inter-related interests exist. The first and
most obvious interest behind a law requiring point-of-sale disclosure of
calorie information is to curb obesity. A second interest, which is
arguably intertwined with the first, is to provide information to prevent
consumer deception to aid in achieving the goal of curbing obesity.259
Combining these two interests, one may phrase the government interest
258. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§4205, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). "According to the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the purpose of the new legislation 'is to give consumers important health
information, and allow them to exercise choice and responsibility about what they
and their children eat."' See Banker, supra note 15, at 905.
259. See supra Part Ill.D.2.
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as making nutritional information readily apparent to consumers to
eliminate deception about the calorie content of restaurant meals so that
they may make more healthful choices to curb obesity and promote
260public health.
Turning first to targeting obesity, activity preceding passage of
the law suggests that it is a relevant interest. It is no secret that obesity
has become a top public-health priority, and various relevant parties,
including the United States Surgeon General, have focused on tackling it
and have urged action.261
The Center for Science in the Public Interest organized support
for the federal law after issuing a report in 2003 maintaining that labeling
262
would help curb rising obesity rates. Following that, "[i]n 2004, an
FDA Obesity Working Group report, 'Calories Count,' recommended
providing nutrition information at the point of sale in restaurants.' The
FDA had a nonprofit organization review that information, and a 2006
report of that nonprofit group "urged that posting [calorie information]
be more accessible."264 It also concluded that the importance of
customers' right to know the calorie content of their food outweighed
265
any other countervailing considerations. Given the governmental focus
on curbing obesity that surrounded the passage of this law and the nature
of the law itself, one may conclude that a primary interest is providing
consumers with point-of-sale nutritional information so that they may
make more healthful choices in an effort to reduce obesity and promote
266
public health.
Related to this objective is the government interest of preventing
consumer deception. As discussed at length in Part III.D.2, these interests
are arguably intertwined. Deception by food establishments leads
consumers (who eat at restaurants more than ever)267 to grossly
260. See supra Part II1.D.2.
261. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Nestle, supra note 186, at
2344.




266. The legislative history for this law does not appear to undermine this
conclusion. See supra note 258.
267. See Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344.
underestimate the calorie content of their meals,268 which contributes to
the obesity epidemic. As FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D.,
said in discussing the federal law, "[t]he menu labeling program will help
Americans get the facts about food choices that are available to them...
so they know what is in the food and can make healthier selections."
According to Hamburg, "[o]ne of the most important things we can do
when it comes to the nation's health is to provide simple basic
information to the American people so they can make choices that are
best for them and their family." 270 The federal menu-labeling law thus
appears to target integrated interests: providing information to eliminate
deception and equip consumers with the facts necessary to make more
healthful choices, which may curb obesity and improve public health. It
is this combined interest that one should analyze in determining whether
the federal law is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
This combined government interest is legitimate.271 Indeed,
"[p]rotection of the health and safety of the public is a paramount
268. See supra Part III.D.2.; see also Nestle, supra note 186, at 2345 ("Almost
everyone underestimates the number of calories in away-from-home foods,
especially when portions are large or the foods are promoted as healthful.").
Consumers generally do not realize that larger portions have more calories. See
Nestle, supra note 186, at 2345. "Many people find it difficult to believe that any
food contains more than 200 or 300 kcal." Id.
269. Press Release, FDA, FDA Releases Guidance on Federal Menu Labeling
Requirements (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm223880.htm.
270. Id.
271. Cf, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (citing cases where
health and safety provided legitimate government interests); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 664 (1985) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concurring)
(describing government's interest in preventing deception as legitimate); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 327-29 (1981) (noting that protecting public health and
safety is a legitimate government interest for Congress); United States v. Ambert,
561 F.3d 1202, 1209 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that protecting public from danger is
legitimate public interest for federal statute); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(noting that the "FDA's policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the
terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects");
Rem v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 320 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2003) (using protecting
public safety as legitimate governmental interest); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d
1353, 1358 (11 th Cir. 2000) (describing public health as a legitimate government
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governmental interest., 27 2 Because the menu-labeling law aims to
eliminate deception to promote public health and safety, it furthers a
legitimate interest and should survive this aspect of review.
C. The Law is Reasonably Related to the Government's Interest
The means the government has chosen to accomplish its interest,
requiring that restaurants post calorie information on their menus and
menu boards, is reasonably related to the government's legitimate
interest of informing consumers to eliminate deception and equip them
with information necessary to make more healthful choices, to improve
public health by curbing obesity. Because the federal menu-labeling law
is reasonably related to the government's legitimate objective, the law
should survive Zauderer.
Though the preliminary results for mandatory menu-labeling in
general are mixed,273 "[m]uch evidence suggests that there is a potential
value in posting calorie counts." Research has revealed great public
275
interest in accessing and using this information. Some preliminary
studies have found that menu labeling, especially when accompanied by
a statement regarding the recommended total daily caloric intake-which
interest); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1999) (characterizing
Congress's interest in increasing safety by curtailing domestic violence as
legitimate); cf Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 964, 973 (7th Cir.
1979) (noting that preventing consumer deception is a legitimate government
interest).
272. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
300 (198 1); see also supra note 241.
273. Banker, supra note 15, at 911.





the federal law contains -leads to reductions in the calories consumers
purchased.277
Other studies suggest menu labeling may not alter consumer
behavior.278 However, as commentator Michelle Banker noted, "these
studies analyze a menu-labeling initiative still in its infancy," and
"supplementary nutrition education programs must first have an
opportunity to take effect before researchers can obtain accurate
evaluations of menu-labeling laws." 2 79 Further, there is evidence
276. Some may argue that the federal menu-labeling law may mandate posting
calorie counts, but it should not require posting the recommended daily calorie
intake. But this provision is important to provide context for calorie information for
individual menu offerings and is thus an important part of why the law is reasonably
related to the government's interest in reducing deception and improving public
health. See supra notes 49 and 217.
277. Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344; see also CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH ADVOCACY, supra note 190; Auldridge, supra note 32. Other studies
contradict this, concluding that posting calories had no effect or may even encourage
some, like young men, to eat more. Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344; see also
Auldridge, supra note 32. Given the forms of some of the studies, these
contradictory results are not easily interpreted. See Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344.
In general, however, the studies suggest "that as time passes customers will become
more familiar with calorie postings and will be more likely to use calorie content to
inform their orders." Auldridge, supra note 32. Time is needed to see the results
borne out. Though the effect on consumers remains to be seen, at least some
restaurants have already altered their behavior in apparent response to menu-labeling
requirements. Id For example, "Starbucks has changed its default milk to 2% (from
whole milk) and McDonald's recently reduced the size of a standard serving of fries
by .7 ounces or 70 calories." Id.
278. See Banker, supra note 15 at 911-13. For example, a recent study
concluded that patrons of Washington chain TacoTime were just as likely to
purchase caloric meals when menu labeling was present as when it was absent. See
Madison Park, Customers Pay Little Heed to Calories on Menus, CNN HEALTH,
(Jan. 18, 2011, 9:34 AM), http://pagingdrgupta.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/18/
customers-pay-little-heed-to-calories-on-menus/?hpt-C2. Of course, this study only
considered data from patrons of one specific, fast-food, chain restaurant, and patrons
who choose TacoTime may not represent the population in general. Perhaps they
care less about healthy eating, which is why they visited a fast-food Mexican
restaurant in the first place.
279. See Banker, supra note 15 at 911.
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suggesting that menu-labeling laws have caused restaurants to reduce
calorie content in menu offerings, though this has also been disputed.280
Data obtained by other localities for their menu-labeling efforts
provides information on the effectiveness of menu-labeling laws in
general, which is useful for predicting the likely success of the federal
effort. The Los Angeles County Public Health Department's 2008 report
on menu labeling "project[ed] that such labeling would prevent 38.9% of
the annual weight gain in the county." 28 1 Another analysis by the
"University of California's Center for Weight and Health shows that
providing calorie information on menu boards could help Californians
avoid more than two pounds of weight gain per year and allow California
as a whole to drop millions of pounds annually." 2 82
The New York City Department of Health similarly projected
success for menu labeling. 28 3 It estimated that menu labeling in New
York City "will prevent at least 30,000 new cases of diabetes over the
next five years." 284 It also estimated that New York's menu-labeling law
has resulted in a reduction in the calorie content of menu items by around
285
ten percent. The Department of Health's research shows that industry
practices for sharing nutritional information are "woefully inadequate,"
but when patrons "see calorie content prior to ordering," they "choose
meals with fewer calories than patrons who do not see calorie
. ,,286information.
280. See id at 913-14; see also supra note 277 (providing studies in support of
the proposition that menu-labeling causes restaurants to offer meals with lower
calorie counts).
281. CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY, supra note 190.
282. See id These reports may be based on labeling in accordance with
California's law, which goes further than the federal law. See id. It requires posting
calorie, saturated fat, carbohydrate, and sodium information at points of purchase. Id.
Though these reports may be based on California's more informative law, the results




285. Banker, supra note 15, at 913-14.
286. CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY, supra note 190.
But see Nestle, supra note 186, at 2345 (noting that one study analyzing New York's
menu-labeling law found that consumers purchased the same foods with menu
labeling as others did without it, but explaining that "[t]his result might be expected,
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Though it may be difficult to predict with sharp accuracy the
effect the federal menu-labeling law will have on improving consumers'
restaurant choices, such accuracy should not be necessary. "Sound
policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and
inferences for which complete empirical support may be unavailable." 2 87
Some may argue that the law is not reasonably related to the
government's legitimate interest. They may maintain that there are more
effective options for improving consumers' health via restaurant meals.
For example, Congress might pass a law requiring that restaurants reduce
the calorie content of their meals or alter the way they market their
288
products. But, as with rational basis review, the decision of what
means would best address the government's interest should generally be
299
left to Congress.
Others might argue that there are alternatives that would
accomplish the government's goal while infringing less on commercial
speakers' constitutional rights. Civil libertarians, for instance, have
maintained that menu labeling is unnecessary in light of other options for
providing nutritional information that restaurants may volitionally
utilize.290 For example, a law could simply mandate making calorie
information available while not requiring that restaurants post it on
menus and menu boards.29'
But a law need not be the least restrictive means to survive
Zauderer.292 Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that posting calorie
since these outlets were located in areas with little choice in restaurants and where
residents might be likely to seek low-cost foods that are high in calories").
287. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC., 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality
opinion).
288. Of course these options would bring their own constitutional questions.
289. "Courts reviewing for a rational basis must accept a legislature's
generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends;
'mathematical nicety' is not required." Taylor v. Rancho Santa Barbara, 206 F.3d
932, 935 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)); City of
Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999).
290. See Banker, supra note 15, at 919.
291. "[A]bout half of restaurant chains [already] provide calorie information
but put it in places where it is unlikely to be seen." Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344.
292. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651-52
n.14 (1985); cf Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993) (noting that
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information where customers will actually notice it while ordering is
more effective than tucking it away somewhere, which is what
restaurants tend to do.293 Furthermore, it is not even clear this alternative
would intrude less on commercial speakers' rights because it would still
arguably compel them to speak (assuming they did not want to make
calorie information available at all).
Still others may argue that calorie postings may not even be
294
accurate. According to one source, the accuracy of calorie postings is
295
currently up for debate. A recent Tufts University study suggests that
menus may list calorie amounts that are as much as eighteen percent less
than the true amnount.296 "Ongoing research into the effectiveness of
calorie listings continues to find points on both sides of the issue."'97
Ongoing research should consider that the federal menu-labeling
law requires that a restaurant have a "reasonable basis for its nutrient
content disclosures, including nutrient databases, cookbooks, laboratory
least-restrictive alternatives are irrelevant in rational-basis review because
government is not required to have chosen least restrictive means to accomplish its
legislative ends); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995) (applying
the more rigorous Central Hudson test and noting that "the 'least restrictive means'
test has no role in the commercial speech context"); Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d
397, 404 (6th Cir. 2001); Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. Univ. Interscholastic
League, 563 F.3d 127, 139-40 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying rational basis review in the
Equal Protection context and noting that least restrictive alternative need not be
chosen). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417
n.13 (1993) ("A [commercial speech] regulation need not be 'absolutely the least
severe that will achieve the desired end,' but if there are numerous and obvious less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between ends and means is
reasonable.") (quoting Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (citation
omitted).
293. See Nestle, supra note 186, at 2344; see also CALIFORNIA CENTER FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY, supra note 190 (noting that New York City's research
shows that "current industry disclosure practices, such as posting information online,
on tray liners, or in brochures, are woefully inadequate: 95% of New York City
diners did not see nutrition information provided in this way").






analyses, and other reasonable means."298 [n other words, though the law
does not require perfection, it does require calorie postings that are at
least reasonable approximations of the actual calorie content of items
offered for sale. Though this calorie information may not be perfect, that
it is a reasonable estimate should be sufficient for Zauderer and its
requirement of reasonableness. Providing a reasonable estimate of
calories in restaurant meals is far better than offering no information.
Another argument one might offer is that the law is under-
inclusive. For instance, it only requires posting calorie information but
does not require posting other information relevant to healthful eating,
like fat and saturated fat. Also, it only applies to restaurants with twenty
or more locations, 2 99 and this exempts many restaurants-including,
300mom-and-pop establishments serving fattening fare across the country.
301
But a law need not tackle all issues in its attempt to ameliorate some.
298. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119, 574 (2010)(to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5); see also Nutrition Labeling of Restaurant Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.10
(2009) (noting that nutrition labels of restaurant foods can be determined by nutrient
data bases, cookbooks, or by other reasonable means).
299. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. at 574.
300. Commentator Michelle Banker has argued that this exemption actually
renders the law less pernicious. See Banker, supra note 15, at 919. Critics of menu
labeling maintain that it stifles restaurants' creativity by restricting recipe
development and limiting menu changes, but Banker argues that concerns about
creativity are more appropriate in the context of small chains or mom-and-pop
establishments, and the federal law does not cover these. See id. at 919.
301. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651-52
n.14 (1985); cf Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990) (noting that the Court is
not at liberty under rational-basis review to hold laws invalid "merely because more
Draconian measures," such as prohibiting all of a certain type of conduct, advance
more completely the government's purpose and "[t]he process of legislating often
involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and [the Court's] ability to
imagine ways of redesigning the statute to advance one of Congress' ends does not
render it irrational"); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) ("But the Equal Protection
Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all."). As the Court noted in Williamson
upon consideration of an Equal Protection challenge based on a law subjecting only
one group to its regulations while exempting others:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one,
admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field
2011] 197
"Moreover, fast-food and restaurant chains constitute approximately 75
percent of total restaurant visits." 302 Providing calorie information for
restaurants consumers visit most frequently is an important step in the
right direction, and one that Congress can take without simultaneously
taking any of many other steps.303
Despite the many arguments some lodge against the federal
menu-labeling law, it should withstand constitutional scrutiny under
Zauderer. The federal government's law is a reasonable means to
address its legitimate objective.
V. CONCLUSION
Like New York's version, the federal menu-labeling law should
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Zauderer supplies the appropriate
test for scrutinizing this law because the law mandates a factual
disclosure and does not restrict commercial speech or compel espousal of
opinions or viewpoints. The government's interest in protecting public
health by curbing obesity is an appropriate interest under Zauderer both
on its face and because it is intertwined with an interest in preventing
consumer deception by providing information to enable consumers to
make healthy choices.
The menu-labeling law should survive Zauderer's test. The
government's objective, to eliminate consumer deception and foster
may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring
different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind The legislature may select one phase of one field and
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.
Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
302. See Banker, supra note 15, at 901 (citing a source explaining this point
and further noting that "major restaurant chains" account for approximately half the
restaurant visits).
303. Moreover, the law enables the Secretary-if he determines that additional
nutritional information should be disclosed to provide information "to assist
consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices,"-to require, by regulation, that
restaurants provide such information in the written materials that the law requires be
available to consumers. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 124
Stat. 119 at 575.
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healthier eating at restaurants to address obesity, is a legitimate
government interest. The menu-labeling law, which provides calorie
information at points of sale, is reasonably related to that legitimate
interest. The federal menu-labeling law should therefore pass Zauderer
and First Amendment scrutiny. The skinny on the federal menu-labeling
law is that it is an acceptable means to shrink America's waistline.

